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INTRODUCTION•
The subject of Collisions in United States Admiralty
Jurisdiction is a most important one in respect to Rll matters
of navigation. Two ships collide. One or both o' them is
injured or completely lost, the cargo is damaged, human life
is destroyed. Has there beer. any negligence, who is to blame,
who may recover, what may be recovered and when may it be re-
covered, are a few of the many questions that arise when a
case of' this kind is brought into Court. Fully half of the
Admiralty cases that come before the United States District
Courts arise out of Collisions. This being the fact it is
important to know what tle law is upon the subject ard where
to find it.
However in spite of the importance of this subject, it
does not seem to ..ave ever bee]1 separately treated by any text
writer. If noticed at all in any text book on Ad-mirality law,
it is given but little space in proportion to its importance,
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and that space is largely :iven up to a statement of what the
rules of navigation are and a comparison of American nnd
English cases. For the past thirty years even that degree of
attention does not seem to have been given. During that tim. e
changes have been mLade i the rules of navigation, the statutes
of limited liability have been oroadened and further construc-
tion of the rules pertaining to navigation been rendered, tius
changing in me ny respects the law as then existing. This being
the fact in order to discover what thIe law of Collisions is,
aside from such indirect light as other branches of Admiralty
law mnny afford, it is necessary to go to the statutes and
adjudicated cases.
It ray be asked, "Though this is so, of what value is
such a knowledge of the Admiralty law of Collisions-- whee
gained?" To the Admiralty lawyer it is of course, a necessary
knowledge in order trint he may proceed with a case at all
intelligently. To those who do not follow Admiralty as a
specialty, it must be admitted it is of comparatively little
importance. But suppose such a case does co-me to one not an
Admiralty lawyer, which frequently happens, and he has no
1j.
general knowledge of the differeht applic3tion of ColMnon Law
principles, of the construction of the technical rules laid
down for the guidaice of ships at sea,priority of liens,and the
many other questions that corvonly arise in a case of Collision.
He must either decline the case, or run the risk of al, ost
certain defeat because of his ignorance. He may from a lack
of knowledge as to the different effect of contributory negli-
gence bring his suit in the state court and because of such
negligence lose everything, when by going into the United
States District Courts, at least half could have been saved
for his client.
So because of the importnnce of the subject as has been
stated and the necessity of going to the original sources for
informntior, th-is subject of Collisiors has been chosen. It
is the purpose of the thesis to show what the law is as applied
to collisions in United States Admiralty Jurisdiction. In doing
so, Statutes that seem to demand no explmation, as those stat-
ing what are proper lights, signals etc., will only be re-
fercou to and their force sr'o effect indicated.
1-)
JURISDICTION OF THE ADMIRALTY COURTS.
At the outset of' this discussion, it is necessary to know
in what waters and in respect to what vessels a question in
collisions may arise and come under the Jurisdiction of the
United States courts. The constitution simply says that the
"Judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases
of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction," leaving the extent of
that jurisdiction to be decided.
As to Territory.
The jurisdiction as it exists to-day is territorially as
follows; The High Seas, harbors, rivers, the Great Lakes and
other inland waters. The High Seas are usually defined as all
tide wpters below low water mark. But from this broad defini-
tJon are usually excepted coast waters nnd harbors and rivers
affected by the tide. Otherwise, every ocean port in the United
States as well as such tide rivers as the Connecticut, the
Hudson, and the Mississippi would be included for a great por-
tion of their length. From the harbors, rivers and other in-
land waters must be excepted all waters not forming a part of
a continuous waterway from one state to another state or
13.
nation. Waters thus completely within the state an-d forming
no part of ar. interstate or international water-way are under
State authority arid exemrt from Adrirmlt Jurisdiction. Any of
the small navigable lakes wholly within a state and forming
no part of such a water-way, would be examples of such exemption.
Adfhiralty Jurisdiction may be gained however, by connecting
such waters by a carnl so as to allow vessels to pass out on a
continuous water-way to another state. Of this artificial
mode of gaining Admiralty JurisdictionCayuga Lake is a good
example. Canals r:ust be included as inland waters and under
Admiralty Jurisdiction. The Ohio River and the Chicago Canal
are examples of connecting waters both natural and artificial.
The conflict over the United States' autnority
beinrg extended to the Great Lakes in questions of Admiralty
was long and bitter- It was finally decided in two collision
cases. The first, "The Propeller Genessee Chief" 12 How.
44-3. wici was strengthened a-d furthered by "The Eagle" 8 Wall
15.
As to Vessels.
Admiralty Jurisdiction extends "to all vessels". As to
what constitutes a vessel there are many decisions. The fact
that the craft in question is not proelle3 by onrs, steam or
sails, or is wholly engaged about harbors and docks and moved
about by tii-s, does not prevent its being looked upon as a
vessel. Examples of what has been allowed ac a vesiel are the
following: A steam dredge (a) A barge without sails or
ruddCer,(b) A floating bath house,(c) Sail-boats and row-
boats are also recognized by the rules of Congress. But a
floating hotel,(d) and a ship not sufficiently conpletu to
control its own movements, (e) have been denied the right
to come within adriralty co'izance.
In brief the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States
over collisions extends to all cases orlsir on the High Seas,
coast-waters, navigable ,,arbors, rivers, canals and other in-
land waters forming a part of a navigrable water-wvay extending
(a). The Starbuck, 61 F. Tep. 502.
(b). Desbrow, v.Walsh Eros.36 F. Rep. 607.
(c). Public Bath, No.l3, 11 F. Rep. 69?.
(d). The Steamboat Hendrick, 3 Benn. 417.
(e ). Steamboat Vermont, 6 DenT. , 115.
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beyond the limits of a-single State, and the Great Lakesand
to all craft that Ahe courtii will dignify with the name of
vessels. This authority extends by right only to cuses where
a-n American vessel is one of the parties, but the jurisdiction
of Admiralty Courts !,1qy be extended to cases of collisions
arising betw een foreign vessels, when such vessels request
a hearing before them. The exercise of this jurisdiction is
a matter of discretion with the court, but there should appear
special grounds for refusing it, w'en asked. It is a matter of
courtesy to the ship asking such jurisdiction and to the
nations which they represent. Such vessels will be bound only
by the law of their domicile.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A COLLISION.
A collision occurs "whenever two vessels coI nii contart."
Thus any touching of one vessel by another technically con-
stitutes a collision. Such a meeting of vessels may occur
under three general conditions.
First: Both may be underway
Second: Neither ship may be underway,but bot. riding at anchor-
Third: One slhip may be underway and the other riding at anchor.
An example of tle first would be,two vessels persuing
courses that cross and at such point of crossing the collision
occurs.
The second is illustrated by two vessels riding at anchor,
but one or both so negligently secured as to allow them to be
thrown against each other by the action of wind and water.
The third case occurs when a snip in an attempt to pass
into its slip runs into another vessel riding near at anchor.
In whatever way the collision may occur it is within the prov-
ince of the Admiralty Jurisdiction to find out the party or
parties at fault and decide the case accordingly.
NEGLIGENCE.
A collision having occured it is neces;sary to dis;cover
f'irst, whether there has been any negligence causing it, second,
of wh.at thIe negligligence consists, and third, who the negligent
party or parties are, in order tlhat liability may be fixed for
the damages sustained. On examination of a case, it may be
found that one of' three conditions exist. It may be found,
First, that no one was negligent:
Second, that only one or part of the parties were negligent:
Third, that both or all the parties were neligent.
Whether the parties are two or more is not important so
far as the principles of law applied are concerned, so for
most purposes but two will be considered.
These three cases will be taken up in their order, but
first it is necessary to consider whiat -enerally speaking
amounts to negligence in a case of collision.
Defi ned.
Negligence in collision cases has been variously defined
but the definitins on the whole amount to this; tnat,
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"Negligence is a failure to exercise the ordinary skill, care
and courage of a competent seaman." Formerly, there seems to
have been a tendency to require a very high degree of care
when in a trying position. Put such certainly is not the re-
quirement at i resent . Ordinary care and skiil is deemed to
be sufficient to demand of a seaman in an emergency, because
the difficulty of the c ituation is such as to render even that
hard to exercise.
Ordinary care and skill must be looked upon as a compara-
tive term. To determine wheter such care and skill has been
used the circumstances under whicn the same were employed must
be taken into considerati r. What might constitute ordinary
care and diligence on the open sea, might be c::treme negligence
in a crowded harbor, or again a steam-sihip might proceed with
perfect bacty over a course which a sailing vessel could not
follow without great risk of collision. Or,a strong vessel of
any kind might safely go without negligence where an old and
weak ship could rot proceed except with great danger. Examples
might be multiplied, but it is enough to sKiow thnt tle term of
"ordinary care and skill" is comparative with the circumstances
under wi.ich the case arises and that the seaman must be one
competent to act under the conditions.
Inevitable Accident.
Act of God.
When a collision takes place without fault of either ship
its cause is termed "Inevitable Accident". An Inevitable Acci-
dent occurs when the accident could not have been avoided by
any care or skill. But in collisions, the term is applied
where the use of ordinary care and skill would not have avoided
the accident. This broader use of the term in Collisions
admits many cases that would otherwise be excluded. An act of
God, however, would come within the more narrow definition.
A hurricane driving two ves.els together with a force beyond
their power to resist would be an example of such an act.
Vessels so colliding could in no way be held in fault. Another
example would be an unexpected calr:. following a strong breeze
or wind, or a sudden veering of the wind that could not have
been ai-ticipated. Such a calm or veering must clearly have bee-n
beyond all reasonatle expectation. So in a case where a light
variable wind was blowing, which at timues woull suddeY-ly fail,
and a vessel while tacking was made to collide with another
20.
because of su:11 a fnilure of the wind, the defense of an act
of God could not be set up. The momentary calms. were riot
sufficiently unexpected to prevent a preparation against their
occurren'ie Previous warning that the wind might fail at any
moment had been given by its reported f'ilure previously. To
constitute an act of God, therefore, it must be such an act as
human foresight could not provide against either because of its
suddenness or overroweriTi force. Strong currents caused by
the usual action of the tides, no matter hov, svift and powerful,
if known to exist can not be classed as such acts. An act of
God being shown as the cause of a colli.ion all imputation of
negligence is at once removed.
From tne nature of the case.,practical!y the only acts of
God that can concern a collision are those in the nature of a
storm, higfi winds or unexpected failure of the wind. A collie
sion might arise because or unknown curre-it2 or a tidal wave,
but such cases are so improbable as to be of value only as
exaples.
Inevitable ActL.
Besides the cases where an act of' God iias occurred, there
are many others whicii are looked upon as inevitable accidents.
What such cases are will be best seey by examples.
Two ships are lying side by side, another pasaes ,ind by
the swell it creates, causes one ship to be thrown against
the r. As betwecL the two ships thus at rest the accident
is inevitable. It could not have been -rrcvented by any ordin-
ary care and skill. Had the respondent vessel been run into
by another and in that way driven against the other ship, the
same defense would exist.
Examples are found, in the drawing of a spile to which the
ship was properly fastened and consequent damage ensuing; (a)
extrTc darkness may prevent either vessel from seeing the
other until too late to avoid a collision,(b) a vesscl set
adrift by some vis major, as a mass of ice or drifting lUmber
thrown against it. (c) A dense fog in which a ship is pro-
ceeding as slowly as posDible and runs foul of a ship at
anchor- (d)
(a) The Mary L. Cushing, 60 F. Rep.1l0.
(b) The Morning Light, 2 Wall. 550.
(c) The Transfer, 56 F. Rep. 513.
(d) Bridgeport, 35 F. Rep. 159.
22.
Also when an intervening object shuts out of view another
vessel, which, because of that flct, is discovered too late to
prevent a coilsiion. This would be the case woen an advancing
steamer or a hulk is in the way. Neither vessel ca. see the
other and eaci; supposes it Las only the steamer and other visi-
ble objects to deal with. Both having exercised duie -. d reason-
able care, the accident must be looked ui-on as inevitable.(a)
Had th.e inlt(evXing object been a projecting headlanid such as
to shut out a part of the path of navigation, and around which
ships were liable to appear, the excuse of an inevitable acci-
dent because of an intervening object could not be employed.
The vessel colliding must be held negligent for not looking out
for just such ships as might come out from behind the headland.
The difference in these cases seems to be largely, if not en-
tirely, one of probability. That one vessel in rotion should
remain hidden behind another, whether in motion or at rest,
sufficiently long to endanger collision is much more probable
than when a headland intervenes which may easily conceal an on-
coming ship for a considerable distance. There is dicta to
(a) The Java, 14 Wall. 189.
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the effect that when such a collision occurred in waters un-
frequented by vessels, being removed from the usual course of
s2.ips, that it ray be regarded as inevitable accident. The
probability of a collision under the circumstances is here
again brought into consideration.
A disabled vessel may be one of the parties to a collision.
If the vessel with which it collides does not know of its dis-
abled condition ,rd is otherwise navigating in a proper manner,
no fault c n be attributed to it. The weak vessel in order
to free itself from fault must at least have endeavored to
give proper warning of its injured condition. Having so en-
deavored to fulfill its duty proriptly and feiled because of
its weakness the collision which ensues may be looked upon as
inevitable. The vessel's weak condition at sea will always
act as an excuse for fault attributable to its condition, if
not due to its own wrong doing. But when a vessel deliber.tely
puts to sea in an unseaworthy condition, there is no doubt that
her feeble state is no defense, but rather evidence condemning
her- Whether such a defense may be set up, and inevitable
accident claimedwhen the injury disabling a vessel has been
24.
caused by another collision, for which she was more or less to
blame has been questioned. But to so hold when a vessel is
acting properly In the second collision would it is considered
be too severe, and inevitable accident may be pleaded as when
not in fault for the prior accident. The James .30 Fe...
Rpt.2WO., is an example of the necessity of a weak or injured
vessel giving wu-lir. g of its condition. The use of proper
care by both vessels must have been exercised as above indicated,
or a case of inevitable accident will not be adjudged to have
occured.
When a collision occurs by the snapping of a chain or the
parting of a tiwler rope or the binding of the steering gear,
or any other similar accident,not the fault of those superintend-
ing that wieic fails to act, a case of inevitable accident will
be allowed. A latent defect is usually a good defaiCco,if proved.
But if in any way due to the carelessnes of those w-.o should
attend to the tiing broven as where a wire rope was used witn
one or two broken strandsia) or a chain with badly worn links,
no such plea can be sustained, but instead a clear case of
(a) The Olympia 61 F. Rept. 120.
25.
negligence exists . Where a nut-was siown to have benr. allowed
to work off, the defence cannot be sustained.(b) These were
things under the direct supervision of the ship master and crew
and by ordinary care would have been seer to and kept in a safe
and fit condition for the purpose for which they were irtended.
In these cases considered, an act of God is the only in-
stance where the accident is in the nature of things strictly
inevitable . In the other cases an extremely high degree of
care would as a rule have avoided the collision. The reasons
for looking upon an act of God as excusing are plain. Such
an act cannot be guarded against by man's care and forethought.
It may occur when he is using tihe highest degree of skill and
care and force one ship against another. No blame can attach.
In the other cases where an Act of God is not present. It is
simply a question of whether or not the court will look upon
the care and skill used by the respondent as equal to the ordi-
nary care and skill of an ordinary competent seamrn in a like
position. To require a higher test would tend to make collis-
ions rever excusable and apply a harsh rule upon all those who
(O) The Altenower E'C F. Rep. 118.
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conduct navigation.
It must not be understood that the mere fact that at the
time ordinary care and skill could not prevent the collision
will make the case one of inevitable accident. If it is due
to the negligence of either party that such conditions ilave
ariser, it i; riot sufficient to show that as soon as the danger
was perceived it could not be avoided, though everything was
done that could be done under the then existing circumstances.
The ordinary care and skill must have been exercised not only
at such time when the danger was perceived, but also for such
a time previous as would have been required to prevent a coming
into the position where such efforts would not be effectual.
A vessel proceeding at too high a rate of speed in a place
crowded iA.itl Kiys, u .til too late to avoid the accident or
without a lookout, will be regarded as having no claim to the
plea of inevitable ccident however well they may have behaved
in the presence of irmmecdiate colli-Sion, (a) A violation of the
rules of navigation of which tL.e above would be an exo.wprle,
wil1_ prevent the successful use of' such a plea, if in any way
(a) The Twenty-one Friends 33 F. Rpt. 190.
27.
such non- compliqnce contributed to the accident. Nothing
will be presumed in favor of the coli-sion bein without fault
in such a case. If the accident was inevitable apart from the
violation, the respordent may show it. It rests entirely upon
him however, to do so. This question of burden of proof will
be separately considered.
In brief,inevitable accident may be shown when the care,
courage and swill of an ordinarily competent seaman under the
circumstances would not have averted the collision. And such
an accident being shown, no negligence is deemed to h1ave existed.
It is next necessary to consider the cases wrere negligence
was present causing the collision. The ways in which a vessel
may be negligent are almost as varied as her motionls and the
conditions under which she may be placed. It is possible there-
fore, only to indicate generally the various kinds of negli.Tence,
Negligence may be roughiy classified first, as negligence con-
sisting of a direct violatinbg of the rules of Navigation or
failure to follow a well regulated custom, and second, when tue
rules of naviCation arid customs have been practically followed,
28.
but there has been carelesEInes, whi-le following them. Under
these two heads all kinds of negligence may be brought. The
main point of value in this distinction is in respect to quest-
ions of burden of proof. A violation of the rules being shown,
the burden is upon the party so violating. In case of a collI--
ion also it has been previously pointed out that one or both
of the vessels may be in fault, and yet remain in court.
The mere fact of a collision dces not of itself raise any
presumption of negligence on the part of either ship. Two
ships have collided. Both are to be deemed free from fault un-
til something is shown denying such an assuimption. Such an
assumption may be denied by showing a violation of rules and
customs , also by the circumstances under which time collision
occured, or by some clearly negligent act on the part of one
or both vessels, aside from such rules and circumstances.
Violation of Pules.
The rules are violated most frequently in cases of too
high a rate of speed,and in the use of lights and other signals,
It is the law of the sea as of the road "to turn to the right",
29.
and a needless failure to so do must be looked upon -,2 negli-
gence. So in all cases a violation of the !aw of' navigation or
a failure to follow n well recognized custom will always be
looked upon as negligence until evidenc e is brought to show
that such violation of the law or failure to follow a well es-
tablished custor, did not contribute to the collision. The
laws are given as defining the scope in which a vessel may act
in entire safety from any legal blame. Having disregarded
these commands shaped in the form of rules, an imputation of
negligence must follow when a collision has thus occurred or
the rules would lose their force. A well regulated custom has
practicAlly the force of law, in fact amounts to an unwritten
law. That such customs are to bcobscrvedis clearly stated in
the rules relating to navigation, (a) This general statement
concerning a violation of the sailing rules is supported by
all the cases. To consider them all selarately would only
result in deducing the general rule stated of such violation
being prima facie evidence of negligence.
(a) 26 Statut at Large P. 320.
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(Better Methods) no Excuse for Violating the Rules.
The question naturally ariseswould it be considered neg-
llgerce in a vessel, if it pursued a course contrary to the
rules laid down by Congress, but looked upon by the best sea-
men as a much safer mode of navigation than that prescribed by
law. By many attorneys appearing for a desperate respondent,
such a course has been stoutly argued as the only proper one
to pursue. At first thougit, it might seem that such care
h,.ving been used, all imputation of negligence ought to be re-
moved. The best of seamen are the ones who should best know
what constitutes the safest mode of navigation. The purpose
of the laws is to make navigation safe and if the acts of the re
respondent are such as tend more surely to further that end, ac-
cording to the opinion of those most competent to judge, what
reason can there be for holding the vessel so actingre guilty
of negligence? As this argument is frequently used it is well
to notice it. The trouble with allowing such a contention any
weight, rests in the fact thathowever true the opinion of
expert seamen may be as to the propriety of allowing such a
method of navigation, it is not a general rule. The next com-
pany of experts th-at co:--e together might well have an entirely
different opinion of what was best and so lead to hopless con-
fusion. The rules of navigation as given would be of no effect,
and each case would have to be tried out in court to decide
whose system of navigation was best. For safety there must be a
given set of rules to be disregarded only at the peril of thiose
so violating. It i s plain that without suchi a system one ship
would not know what to expect of n.other- One who takes a
course forbidden by law does so at his peril and the ex.uso that
the unlawful way is the best, will not save him, and in a case
of collision in Admiralty there is no good reason why the rule
should be varied. If the master of a ship prefers to run such a
risk, re may, but he and his ship will be held to blame for any
collision occuring thereby.
A good example of cases involving this theory is seen wnere
greater speed has bee',- r]intained than was allowed by law. In
fact, it is in connection with the questior of speed tnat this
argument usualjy has been presented. Section 423 of the
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Revised Statutes reads, "Every steam vessel when approaching
another vessel so a6 to involve risk of collision shall slacken
her speed or if necessary stop and reverse and every steam
vessel shall when in a fog go at a moderate speed."
This section came up for interpretation in the City of
New York 15 F. Ref. 62= and again in the Clare, admr..vProvidence.
S.S.Co.20F. Rep. 535. In the later case, the steam vessel in
fault was steering from one light of a narrow channel across
to another at full speed in a heqvy fog. Experienced seamen
agreed in saying that this was safer than going at the moderate
speed required by law, so long as that speed meant less than
full speed. It was said that by going at a slower rate, col-
lision would be more apt to occur as the ship more eaisily lot
her way not being able to tell so accurately how long it would
take at the reduced speed to come in sight of the opposite
light as it was possible to do when going at the usual rate.
The judge, however, looked upon the law as of first consideration,
and importance. Whatever the section right mean by 'moderate
speed' it was clear it meant less than the usual rate. The
laws of navigation demanded that a certain mode of navimtion
be followed. If the laws were unwise, it was the province of
Congress to enact now ones not that of the courts or expert sea-
men. Any other decision on this question would of recossity
nullify the law.
Circunstances Raising Presumption of Negligence.
The circumstances under which a collLsior occurs may be
such as to impute negligence to a vessel when shown, though
the bare fact of n collision does not. The relation of the two
vessels may be such as to leave no rea -crable ground for any
other conclusion. In The Bridgeport 7 Blachford 361, a steam-
boat ran into a vessel lying moored to a wtarf, striking her
nearly head on about amid-ships. At the time v heavy fog pre-
vailed hiding the ship and wharf. The lights above the wf.arf,
however, were visible arid the locality was known by the person
steering the vessel. The court held thnt under such circum-
stances a presumption of negligence was raised, by the fact of
a collision against the vessel in motion. No vessel could be
seen, but it waz known that the locality was one where vessels
were very likely to be. This was shown by the lights v; sible
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above the wharf. This decision has since been sustained, and
is still indicative of the rule that negligence may be presumed
when a collision occurs because of the surrounding circumstnn-
ces. Wher the collision takes place and one ship is out of her
course, the presium.ption of contributory negligence arises from
the fact that a rule of navigation has beer. violated, rather
than from the circumstances aside from any violation. A ship
in motion colliding with a ship at anchor always tends to raise
a presumption against the moving ship. The presumption thus
raised as in the violation of' the rules of navigation may be
overcome.
Where no Presumption Arises.
The cases where a presumption of neligence arises have
been considered. As to what constitutes negligence aside from
these special cases, there is no marked difference, between
Admiralty and Coarmon law. The acts complained of must be
shown to have constituted negligence which aided in bringing
about the collision. In every such case, where there is no
presumption, the entire question of negligence is one of un-
aided f)ct. in a search for negligent acts, the court will not
always be satisfied by finding fault in one or even in bothl
vessels but, if the neg*ligenec is very slight on one side and
very great on the other, it may endeavor to discover wheth.er
the negligence contributing to the disaster was suffficient
under thae circumstances to hold t-ie party responsible at all.
In such cases, where the negligence is very slight, if any,
the court may disregard it as not being of sufficient importance
and certainty to be given any insight. This would apply only
to cases where the neglect complained of relative to thie con-
sequences to be suffered if" held to create a liability would
be entirely disproportionate. In such instances the neglect
on the part of the other vessel is considered as being suffi-
cient to have caused the damage.
Proximate Cause.
In both law and admiralty it is sought to discover what
is the proximate cause of an injury suffered and the negligen-
ce of a party is judged accordingly. In tile previous cases,
certain ft rts being shown, they were at once connected as the
proximate cause of a collision by menrs of a rebutable presu-np-
tion. In cases where no such presumption arises not only must
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a negligent act be shown, but also some evidence that such an
act contributed to the collision. So in a given case though
negligence might be proved on the part of either libellant or
respondent, if such negligence is not in some way connected
with the disaster either by presumiiption or direct evidence as
the proximate cause of the injury in whole or in part, it will
not be considered. When a presumption has been raised it must
be removed by snowing thvit the negligence in no way contributed
to the disaster.
It may be that both vessels were in fault, but one vessel
had every chance to have avoided the collision. In such a case,
if one vessel is to be looked upon as alone to blame, it will
be that one which had the last clear chlance to avoid danger.
Though the injured ship was guilty of some negligence, that
negligence will not count against it, if the other vessel had
ample opportunity to see the position of the vessel injured
and did nothing to avoid a collision, but instead was itself
,iilty of neglect, contributing directly to the disaster. The
MylcCalden, v. The Edgew,-ter, 65, F. Rep. 527, is a good illus-
tration of whiat is here ieant. Two tows were -,as3lng, one up
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tne other down the river. Just beyond one of tihom the vessel
of the libellant was proceeding at a high rate of speed, with
its masts extending fifty or sixty feet above th,.e tow, though
thus in nearly full view, the respondent, after waiting for
the tows to 1'ass, started alhead at full speed and collided
with the libeliant. The negligence of the respondent was held
to be the proximate cause, and that, that vessel alone must
bear the loss. The libellants negligence consisted in not com-
plying with the Starboard rule. But the fact ti-at it did not
so comply had no effect on the result, as the respondent could
easily have se-n and avoided the danger, had it been tending
to its duty. It was a vessel at rest, about to start in motion
at full speed, before doing so it had the last clear opportun-
ltr to have avoided any possibility of a collision. Having
entirely disregarded this opportunityit must suffe-f the con-
sequences of being held alone in fault for the proximate cause
of the collision. Had the libellant been on the proper side
of the tows, it was not thought th it th e result would have been
any different. In either case the respondernt should j-ave seen
her, and had the last clear chance of avoiding collision by
so doing.
The Portia, G4 F. Rep. 811, is a case involving this same
question of proximate cause. A line of tu ts wals cra.ing up a
river and a steam-boat was going down. The line of tugs war
violatiL7 the rules of navigation, but the steam-boat had a
full view and plenty of room in which to avoid them. In try-
ing to do so,the steam-boat herself violated the rules and
thereby caused a collision which would not have occurred but
for such a violation. The act of the steam-boat was looked
upon as the proximate cause. She had every opportunity to avoid
the tow, and being handled with greater ease, was possessed of
the last clear chance to do so. (a)
Negligence may consist in a defective equipment, or in a
ships putting to sea in an unseaworthy condition. A steamer on
meeting a sciooner, puts her Lelm over to avoid t:nat vessel and
the rudder ch-iin snaps, causing a collision; If in such a case
the chain wais badly worn, and trough open to ready inspection,
had not been attended to, the fact will be looked upon by the
court as constituting negligence on the part of the owners.
(a) The Clara, 55 F. Rep. 1021.
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A defective engine on a steam-boat, failure to employ a tug
when rocliired; an insufficient or unskillful crew, and a sail-
ing vessol not in good trim, are furt.er instances of such neg-
ligneces on the part of the ships owner. in all sucl-: cases
the ovmrers. are perrnitted to show that they properly equipped
the vessel and carefully looked to its being in rood condition
and properly manned at the time it started out. They would
also show that they took care to keep the same in needed re-
pair. Such evidence if sustained, would constitute a good
defense.
As has been said, a loss may arise where the party in
fault does not cone into actual contact with the ship injured.
A good example of such a collision is found in the case of
The James Gray, v. The John Frazier, 21 How. 184. The James
Gray was lyin; by in the channel in Charleston harbor, but with-
out any light, contrary to the harbor regulations and other-
wise at fault. The John Frazier came into the chiannel in tow
of a tug. There was plenty of room to pass and the James Gray
was clearly visible. Mihen about four hundred feet distant,
the tug carelessly cast off without giving tiie John Fra2er any
warning. The impetus of the vessel, in spite of all that could
be done to Yrevenrt a collision, carried it against the James
Gray, doing a considerable damage. The court held ti:at the
tug must be looked upon as the boat whose negligence caused the
collision and not the John Frazier, which actually collided.
The James Gray was also looked upon as in fault for its viola-
tion of the harbor rules. The only ground upon which the John
Frazier could have been held negligent, would have been that of"
agency. But that too, ought to fail for the reason that no
such act as that of hurling the vessel free in the channel
could in any way be looked upon as authorized by the principle
in employing txhe agent.
Whether two vessels or one are in fault, no different
questions arise in respect to negligence. Wat constitutes
negligence in one ship will constitute negligence in another
as a general rule. Exceptions to this statement may occur-
An example would be when one vessel is compelled to hold its
course and t.e other to keep out of the way, as is the case
with sailing vessels and those propelled by steam. But if the
vessels are in a'n equal position, the general statement applies.
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Acts in Extremis.
In considering what constitutes negligence, it must not
be understood tlhat an act committed, or an omission to act, in
the extremity of the moment of collision, will be re-arded as
negligence, when the difficult position is not due to the fault
of thc ship so acting. An exa!iple would be the putting of the
helm to post, when it should have been put to starboard, the
circumstances being such as to confuse a seaman of ordinary
nerve and experience. An arbitrary admiralty rule might vary
this holding. The Galileo, 28 F. Rep. 469, was a case where
in the presence of inevitable collision the engines were re-
versed, but an anchor was not dropped which might have averted
the collision. Such ani omission in the extremity of the moment
was looked upon as excusable. In anothier case,(a) a steam-
boat allowed a sailing vessel to get too near and then in the
extremity of danger, committed an error. This was hold inexcus-
able as the s±ip so doing was not free from blame before the
error was comiitted.(b) So in order to have an act or its
(a) The Carroll, 8 Wall. 302.
(b) The Elizabet2 Jones, 112 U.S. 514.
omission excused, when done in the excitment of ti-e -.-ioment
before the collision, the s.-Ap so acting must be otheo'wise fvou,
from blame. That such ricts in extrorils should be excused, is
sustained by the equitable side of the court's powers. 1,V, ere
both vessels are so acting or fail to act, in a case otherwise
free from fult, the case becomes one of inevitable accident
which has been previously considered.
Pilot's Negzligence.
If a pilot is directing the course of a ship when a col-
llsion occurs, the question naturally arises, will the negli-
gence of the pilot be attrbted to the ship under his care?
When the pilot 1-as be*n taken volentariiy,there is no doubt
but th!at it should and would, he being the ship's volentary
agent for the purpose of navigation. The contention arises
when a vessel is compelled to take a licensed pilot by force
of law. It is said tlt such a pilot cannot 'be looked upon
as an agent of the vessel, but ratler as an agent of the law,
so that the ship ought not to be liable for a collision caused
alone by his negligence. In the Ciina, 7 Wall. 53, the question
arose squarely in a case of negligence on the part of the pilot
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which caused a collision. It was held t iat tio ne-ligece of
the pilot must be looked upon as the ship' s negligence. This
discussion has been cited with force in later cases. (a).(b).
Siderainda v. Mapes, 3 F. Rep. 873, is cited as supporting a
contrary doctrine, but it is not at all in point. The pilot
in that case is being sued by the owner of' the vessel he was
piloting and no question of injury to a third vessel arises.
Tii following thle principle laid down in The China, the English
rule has ben refused as not tending to the best public good.
The pilot , it is true, is placed upon the ship by force of
law, and without one a ship must pay a fine and proceed at her
peril. But just as a requirerent that a vessel shall be sea-
worthy when she starts out and shall have a proper equipment,
etc., is for the good of such vessels as well as for the public,
so is the regulation requiring a pilot for the ship's benefit.
No vessel can know all harbors and channels, but a trained
pilot may be thoroughly acquainted with his own harbor and chan-
nel,and conduct a snip in safety when she could otherwise pro-
ceed only with danger. Further, the pilot is liable to the
(a) Barnes, v. The District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 546.
(b) Sherloc.k, v. Alling, 93 U.S. 107.
ship for improperly piloting her, so the burden placed upon
the vessel is not so onorous as at first may seem. The public
are best served by such a law, fierst, by their interest being
placed in the best of care and second, by iaving a responsible
party, as the ship's owner to look to who will usually be bettor
able than a pilot to make good any loss that may be occasioned.
The United Stases holding seems equally as just as the English
rule and is based upon better public policy.
Wilful Negligence.
The harm may be caused by what is sometines c'lLed wilful
negligence. Negligence implies a lack of any intent to do
the iLarm complained of. But here the party in fault bs rought
about the collision by his own wilfull carelessness or wrong
doing. In a case where two vessels wilfully collide, it is
laid down as a dictum of the courts, (a) they might see fit to
look upon them bot. ns criminals and refuse to adjudge the loss,
leaving each to suffer the consequences of its acts. Certainly
as between themselves they could merit nothing from the courts,
but punishment. If, but one of the parties was shown to be
(a) Stur,-is, v. Clough, et al 21 1-ow. 451.
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w7ilfuliy in the wronr1 , no protection or excuse could be offered
for him. Ralston, v. The State Rights, Crabe an early
case which serves as an excellent example of such wilful col-
lision. The States Ri ,hts deliberately and repeatedly ran
its iron ice beak into the s;iip of' a rival company. The court
said that in such a case not only was the ship so acting, alone
in fault, but thnt punitive damages might also be given.
In brief, negligence consists of any violation of the
rules and customs of navigation or in specific acts aside from
such rules and customs. It must be contributory to the collis-
ion. If no such negligence is shown, the collision must be
looked upon as caused by an inevitable accident. From the
mere fact of collision , no presumption of negligence arises.
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BURDEN Oi PROOF.
The burden of --roof in a case of' collision rests first,
upon the libeliant. As has been indicated the mere fact of a
coll3l:on raises no prestuption of negligence and consequently
creates no burden. The libellant hlas first to make out a prima
facie case of negligence on the respondents part vhich 'night
reasonably be supposed to nave in some degree contributed to
the collision. If' there is doubt as to whether the evidence
presented is such as to make out a prima facie case for the
libellants contention, the burden has not been created and the
action must fail. But the burden of proof does not rest on
the libellant all through thle casc. Having once made out a
prima facie case of negligence against the respondent, the bur-
den then rests upon that -party to show that his negligence did
not contribute to ti1o loss in whole or in part. This is simply
a following of the general rule at law. The respondent may in
turn place a burden of negligence on the libellant, wiiich must
be sustained in - like manner. According as this burden is
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sustained, one, both or neither wil be liable. The placing
of this burden is illustrated by any case where one vessel ac-
cuses anothlir of being in flailt for a collision.(a) For ex-
ample, if a ship proves that while at _u1 !hor in a proper place
another ran into the anchorage ground and collided w'ith her,
negligence has apparently been shown on the part of the moving
vessel and the burden is upon her to remove all such iiputation.
The burden of' proof may be raised against another ship in
two ways. First, it may be that the mere circurristances of the
collision will be sufficient when shown, to raise a presLmption
of negligence and a consequent burden without giving any fur-
ther evid 'nce to connect those facts with the collision.
Second, certain facts may be sthown but, it is necessary to give
evidence connecting them with the collision as its cause. In
one instance thie law raises a presumrption, in the otter it
does rot.
Violation of Rules.
A violation of a statutory regulation raises a presumption
of negligence and without further snLowing the court will usually
consider the burden as upon the one violating to prove that the
(a) The Drew, 35 F. Rep. 789.
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negligence complained of did not contribute to tile collision.(a)
In the Conoho 24 F. Rep 758., the burden was placed upon the
respondent for a violation of the statute as to lights. The
Conoho had only a white light burning w,;hich gave it the appear-
ance of being a vessel at anchor. An approaching vessel steered
its course acr:ordingly a-rd a collision ensued. The court said
that the burden of proof was upor, the vessel whose lights were
attacked, to show by clear proof that her lights were properly
Placed and burning at and just before the collision. To create
this burden of proof', the violation complained of must have
been such as could have contributed to the collision. The
Supreme Court has said that the mere fact of a violation of a
rule would not place tLe blmie and burden upon the one violating
where it could not possibly have had anytling to do with the
collision. An example would be where there was no loo-out at
the time when a ship collided with a sunken hulk, whose pres-
ence was not known and could not have been discovered had the
lookout been in his place. So in considering whether tle viola-
tion of a rule would put the burden of proof upon the one
(a) The City of "Gashington, 92 U.S.31.
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violating, the court may use its discretion in such instances.
However it seems certain that nojy' but a clear case as in
the above example, would prevent the burden from falling. (a)
Collii.on of a Ship at Anchor.
.:.erc it has been shlown that the respondent collided with
the libeliant ship ;vhen at an-chor in a proper place, the burden
is at once laid upon the respondent by the aid of the presmapt-
ion that the moving vessel was to blame. Such a burden may be
removed in many ways, as by showing that the vessel at anchor
was not obeying the rules in respect to lights or signals and
iL-at the respondent was navigating properly. It seems follow-
ing the general Admiralty rule, that even if the libellant
vessel was in fault in such matters as proper lights, signals,
a sufficient watch, etc., that the respondent must have used
due and ordinary care under the circumstances in order to escape
free from blanme.(b) In a recent Federal c,)se, (,i). where a
collision occurred between a moving ship and a dredge at anchor,
it was considered that those facts being shown, the burden
(a) The Farr.wut,lO Wall- 334. The America,92 U.S -ib .
(b) The Drew, 35 F. Rep.%I9.
(c) The D.H. Miller, 76 F. Rep. 877.
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of proof had been met ,ind transferred to the respondent, to
show tiat, It wfls not witi-in its power by reasonable care to
prevent the collision. The presumption o,7 negligence and
consequent burden of proof was looked upon as clearly against
the movin-r vest,3el in thlis and all cases, when one snip was
at anchor. It was further held as a rule of admiralty law
that such a presumption could not be removed by attributing the
collision to a deceitful tide, in a harbor where the tides
were well known, nor by the raising of mere presuptions or
suggestions of fault on the part of the libeliant. To sustain
suhi. a burdcn the proof must at least, be as clear and decisive
as that which placed the respondents blirden upon him. Plothmer,
et a]. v. The F. and P.M. No. 1, 45 F. Rep. 703, is a case
holding to the same princi-,le of law, but somewhat peculiar
in its fncts. Two propellers were aground, but for the moment
had stopped their efforts to get free. It was plain however
that they were about to make anot.er attempft. A third pro-
peller, the respondent, tried to go by them, but so near as
to be put out of course by the current, caused oy a fresh
attempt to get free and was driven acainst a schooner moored at
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a pier. The fact of a collision witih the ship at anchor along
side the pier raised a strong presumption of negligence whic
was further strengtiened by the carelessness shown in approach-
iu- too near the grounded propellers. The burden thus raised
was sustained. (a) It may be tf-at tle vessel at an.ch or is
shown to have been improperly anchored or by some other act to
have probably contributed to or' been 6nti-roly i- fult for the
collision. A burden is then upon the libellant to freo itself
aom blfrme. This mar be the case whether the respondent has
entirely freed himself or not. It" tne libellant was anchored
in the usual course of ships, the ourden would be upon h1.im to
show that such an act did not contribute to the collision .(b)
Special Circumstances.
Circwflsta:'es hy be proved tihat would compel the vessel
at anchor to show not merely thpt it was at >ichor when the col-
lision occurred, but also that damagos sustained were due to
tlhe collision and not to some outside force. In The Maryland,
14 F. Rep. 307. About the time of the collision, ice was
(a) The Michigan, 52 F. Rep. 501.
(b) The Armonia, 67 F. Rep. 363.
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drifting heavily around.the ship at anchor, with a force suffi-
cient to have ctaused the damages sustained. Under such circum-
stances the burden was also put upon the libellant to show tlhat
the damages were caused by the collision rather than by thle
drift inir ice.
Many other questions may be raised which the libelLant
must meet, as when passa-e was very difficult to thread,
because of a derrick working at one side, or by reason of the
tempestuous condition of the weather, or that the ship at
anchor was lidden by some intervening object. In such cases
the libellant wili have the burden of showing that these con-
ditions would not have caused the collision, had the respondent
been navigating properly.(a) In the Passaic, 76 F. Rep. 460.,
the same rule was sustained in principle, though both parties
were held in fault. The steamer was to blame for going need-
lessly close to the ship at anchor. The schooner was at fault
for unnecessarily roiaining at ancn-or near a wreck on a windy
night, in the way of cross currents and in the path of naviga-
tion, and also for being in such a position with both anchors
(a) The Depew, 59 F. Rep.791.
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out making it most difficult to escape in the presence of
threatened collision. The burden here placed upon the libellant
by the respondent was done without the aid of any legal
presumption.
Steaiibrt -: niing Vessel.
I1 a ste-uri-boat and a sailing vessel collide, the burden
is upon the steam-boat to show that the cllision was not due
to its negligence. (a) The reason for this is that a steam-
ship is :-ucn more easy to handle than a sailing vessel. Where
two such vessels meet, the sailing vessel' is obligued to keep
her course and the stemm-boat to keep out of the w-,y. The
steam-boat having nearly every advantage over a sailing vessel,
a collision occuring the burden is -laced upon it. The Gypsum
Prince, 67 F. Rep. 612, holds that the vessel which is bound
to keep out of the way must show by a fair preponderance of
evidence that the collision was due to fault of the other
vessel. In all cases of a violation of the rules, the facts
are looked upon as peculiarly within the knowledge of the
vest ;el accuse a, so the burden is placed uT on such a ship to
remove the presumption.
In brief the burden of proof may be upon - vessel, because
(a) Donnell , v. Boston Towboat Co.,89 F. Rep. 7b7.
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of a violation of the rules of navigation, from the peculiar
circumstances of a collision, or by force of' other negligent
acts apparently the collisions direct cause.
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DAMAGES.
In discussing the subject of' damages, it will be more or
less difficult to avoid treating of liability at the same time.
Damazes are t,,- be- looked upon as the cause from whichi Liability
may arise. Tne purpose of the court is always as far as possible
to put the innocent party in the same position as before the
damages complained of occurred. To do this it is necessary
to know what will and wihat will not be looked upon as damages
in any given collision case. Speaking generally, ali injuries
ani losses the direct result of a collision will be looked
upon as constituting the damages. In order to discover what
damages will be looked upon as direct, and how they are ascer-
tained, it is necessary to take specific instances amd therc
find the various ite>.s allowed.
There are some kinds of loss which would usually be suf-
fered in a collision case, that stnd out clearly as constitut-
ing proper elements of damages, as soon as a search for such
elements is made. Such losses would be, the value of the ship
5E3.
whon a total loss, the depreciated value of the ship if Only
injured, cost of repairs,. loss oi" cr>:o, loss to bau -age, loss
of' freight. These forms of losz it would som, would stand
out plai'ly as elemeints of damage. Others will be discovered
on further investigation. Considering the losses fron the stand-
point of the thing or person sustaining them, they would be
generally classified, as loss to the ship, loss to the cargo,
loss to seamen, and loss to passcngers.
To The Ship.
The loss to the ship may be to her as a ship or in her
earning capacity. Having determined that a ship has suffered
some damages the difficulty consists in measuring them. If
thle vessel is a complete loss, in order to ascertain the. damagres,
her market value at the time is to bc taken as a proper estimate.
If her home port is a suitable market, her value in that port
will usually be taken. If in a foreign port at the time of
collision, the market value in the home port will always be
taken. (a) It may be that the ship has a s]ecial value to
an owner which the market value would not include. If this
special value is re'isonably placed upon the vessel, it will be
(a) The Laura Lee, 24 F. Rep. 483.
allowed and damages assessed accordingly.(a) A vessel peculiar-
ly constructed for sorme special local purpose, or in the fur-
therance of any particular object not co .;ion to nautical inter-
ests might well have no market value at all except as so much
lumber, while to the owner its timber constituted only a small
portion of its wort,. The damages suffered by the owner are
what the vessel is worth to him. This as a rule is vit it will
bring in market, but there being no suitable market that method
fails, in a case where the special value consists in thae
assumed value found in an offer of purchase not accepted, it
will not be allowed, but the mar!et price will be taken instead.
The reason for this is that the court WisKes to avoid making
the one causing an accident, pay the price set oy another's too
high valuation. Had the offer been accepted, but title had
not pas. ed, it would seem that such a price aould be looked
upon as properly estimating the libellant's damages, for wrhether
a hi gn estimate o-' not, it is exactly what he loses because of
the collision. If the ves el lost is a pleasure yac'-t, some
method must be adopted for ascertaining its value, because usual-
Ilv there would not be any good ready market. The ves el has a
(a) The Normandie, 58 F. Rop 427.
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special value not obtainable at a public sale. In such a case,
it may be ascertained by considering the oc,:asional cost of
building and its condition at the time of collision. A good
inquiry would bo what 1,vo-ld a person of suitable means give
for such a vessel at the time it was lost. in most cases where
the ship has a special value to the owner, it might be ascertain-
ed in the above manner. (a)
Abandoned Ship.
When a ship has been abandoned at sea and has subsequently
becomie a total loss, the abandonment is not justified by the
mere fact of a collision caused by anoti.ers fault. Those on
board must have used ordinary courage and judgment in standing
by their ship. The court will, however, take into consideration
the difficulty of the situation, the probable danger to be
faced, if the snip is not left to her fate, as well as the
general action of the master and his crew at the time. In an
early case,(b) a collision occur-ed in northern waters be-
tween two whaling vessels. One ship was abandoned. Another1
vessel injured at the same time reached the home port, althoich
(a) The H.T. Demock, 17 F. Rep. 226.
(b) Swift, V. Brownell, i Holmes 467.
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in much the same condition as the one deserted. Before abandon-
ing the vesel tho roadster and. his crew hal considered the matter
carefully and rad remained by the ship in the face of great
damner. The court considered that proper courage and judgmient
had been exercised, and that tlhe full value of the abandoned
ship shauldbe taken in estimating damages. Had the master not
been justified in his action, the damages actually suffered by
the collision could still be considered so far as they were
due to the reslpondent's negligence. or not an abandon-
ment was justifiable in a given case must be determined by the
special facts comnected with such disaster.
Weak Ship.
It may be found that the ship lost or injured was in a
poor and rotten condition to which condition the loss was at-
tributable as much as to negligence on the part of the respond-
ent. In such a case damages would be divided, it being fully
as negligent to go about witi, such a sickly craft as to navi-
gate in a careless manner. (a)
rhese damages fall on one or both vessels according as
one or bot. were ne_.1:c_-nt. Whether or not each shall stand
(a) The John R. Ronson, 86 F. ReP. 696.
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just one-half the loss is a question of liability rather than
damages.
Items of Damage.
When the ship injured is only a partial loss, her depre-
ciated market value, if sold unrepaired, would be a proper
estimate o dr-iages. The cost of repairing so as to make the
vessel as good as before, and all direct and natural expenses
and losses due to the injured condition of the ship are con-
sidered when ascertaining damages. If the ships injury is the
only loss, the cost of needed repairs would constitute a cor-
rect valuation. The ship must be completely repaired at once,
or as soon as circumstances will reasonably allow. If time un-
necessarily intervenes, or a vcyavae is taken which increases
the damaged condition of the ship, a suitable reduction must
be made for the damages thus increased. (a)
Other items of damage to the ship are towage demanded
as a necessary consequence of the collision; a survey taken of
a vessel to ascertain its condition; demurrage, estimated in
the absence of a charter party or a marcet price by the average
net profits of the ship during the trip in question and those
just previous; traveling expenses of the ships owner to and
(a) The Henry M. Clark, 22 F. Rep. ?52.
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from the wreck; and interest, at six-percent usually, upon
injuries sufifered and e,:Ifousos necossitatod. (a)
Int e:e 0, t.
Interest on the amount representing the sliip's loss would
run fro m t:c ti e of collision, but on expenses incedental
thereto it se ns to be computed from the date of such expenditu-
re. The giving of interest on damages rests largely in the dis-
cretioi off the court. Where a vessel has been put in better
condition by the repairs necessitated, than at the time just
prior to the collision, no interest will be allowed. (b)
Salvag e expenses may be figured as a proper item of damages.
Costs of' raising a sunkert vessel, value of sails and tackel
lost, seamen's wages, and many other similar expenses may be
brought as dama!;es to the ship The expense of tryin7 to raise
a sunken vessel is a common item of damages, so lone as spent
in good faith, even though the attempt was a failure. Also
expenses of ascertaining the injuries to such a ship before
making any effort to raise it.(c) If both vessels are to blam
(a) The Oregon, 89 F. Rep. 521.
(b) The Alaska, 44 F. Rep. 489.
(c) The Oneida, 84 F. Rep. 716.
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for the collision, the same principle holds good, the only dif-
ference beiiic in liability. The owner of' a sulnken ship having
decided not to rnise it, the respondent 'ay do so himself, but
cannot it se, ms compel tie former owner to take it as part cor-)n-
pensation for dwaes. Demurrage is also aliowed.
Loss of' Earnip s.
The loss suffered by a ship may be in her ecarninr capacity.
Freigi't having been lost because of the collision, its amount
is to form a part of the damages. Probable earnings will be
allowed in suci. u cmse. The cost of hiring another vessel to
take the place of the one injured has been favorably considered.
(a) Also, the difference in value between a c:.arter lost in
consequence of the collision and a new one granted subsequent-
2y. (b) But in a case where the ship was a total loss the
prospective catch of fish was refused as an element of damages.
The prospective c wte.a -s looked upon as too uncertain. Tie
compensation received from the inter-est alowed on. t,.e value
of the lost vessel must be looked upon as taking tile place of
any posible profit frrm the catch of fisn. (c) Had the vessel
(a) The Emma Kate Ross, 50 F. Rep. 845.
(b) The Bel(enland, 36 F. Rep. 504.
(c) Guibert, v. The George Bell, 3 F. Rep. 581.
been in tle .- idst of her fishing, and tihereby iven some indi-
cation of what the prospective loss really was, the case might
r:ave been loo!(ed upon differently.
To The Cargo.
If the cargo is lost, the innocent owner is entitle1 to
-ave all direct injuries estimated in damages. Whether full
damages can. be recovei'-,,,-'ill depend on the statutes of limited
liability. The vessel injured must do ali it can to repair
the ship and save the cargo from harm. If sur, care is not
taken by th1e carryin-g shir,, dirtages that would otherwise not
stand against it,because of' the limited liabii-ty act ,- ay do
so. A case of tr.is nature would be where only a small hole
admitted water onto grain or goods, which, was not attended to.
The vessel in fault alleging such a cause, m.ust prove it.(a)
How Valued.
The cargo r.y be the property of the owner or master of
the ship or of third parties. In either case it forms a part
of the damages to be borne in whole or in part by t.c respond-
ent. The value of the cargo according to Swift v. Brownell,
cited above ;1nJ. o:t,,er cases is to be ascertained by finding
its probable value at its home port, or a crtral lar'et at tlhe
(a) The Gladiator, 79 F. Rep. 445.
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time when it would ordinarily IJAve be, ,elivered. In this
case the cargo was one of' whale oil and bon, and the Lome tort
vtaL a central market for that commodity. If some central market
was not tpke for the ascertaininW of vfilue, but the nearest
port, or a port to whicE. the vessel was bound or might choose,
an unreasonable value would often be placed upon the car.o lost,
because of peculiar circi itances existing at that port at
such a ti-s.e. In another case previously cited, Guibert, v.
The George Bell, a cargo of fish was allowed in damages, its
vaiue being ascertained - dyhe value of tlhe fish in a near by
port, such port being a good market for that species. One
fourth of the value of the ship's outfit for the season also
was allowed, the ship Lavil g been out three fourths of the
season. Besides these damages, custom house charges in a for-
eiin port were admitted.
It is often the case that tirae is wanted in which to re-
condition a c-'ro dmaged but not entirely lost. In such a
case a 'easonable time is ,liven for re oJitiomlng, but after
that all extra loss sustained must be borne by the c~rgo owners.
Vvhat would constitute a reasonable time would vary according
to the circumstances and the article injuz-o i. In AorJlinger,
v. Nelson, 61 F. Rep. 66S, more than a reasonable time had
beer consumed -r-nd in consequence a poorer market at the time
of sale. The loss occasioned by not beini; reaily to sell with-
in a reasonable time could not figure as damages against the
respondent L-cia_' s to car-o may be refused as against a ship
responsible for -t collision witn a ro e -,, ah.ky craft, too
weak to go into dry-dock for repairs. This would undoubtedly
be ti-e decision when it was shown that had the vessel been fit
to be used, no injury to cargo would have occurrd. (a)
Crew and Passengers.
In a collision, sailors may lose their personal effects.
Wlether the loss can be looked upon as damages de enCJ.s upon
the fault of the ship which they help navigate. They may have
damages ascessed in an opposite proportion to the fault of' the
ship. If the shil, is not in any way to blano, t.:en all may
be counted. If partly to blame, then only half. If alone to
blame, then niotnin> A sailor's fortunes are said to follow
those of his ship. If the personal ef-'ects are tfe property
of passengers,as baggage tne owners may recover to the full
(a) Tine 1ew Yo_'k , 40 F. Re. 900.
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amount of loss against either vessel or both.(a)
Personal Injuries.
The damaes sufere, instead of being those to property,
may be to person. These injuries may or may not produce d1eit-.
T.e remedies for such injuries are the same as at common law,
and on bein; estimated "Yty be allowed as damages. If the in-
jured person was a sailor aiding in the navigation of one of
the vessels, it would seem that the dni1nvoe, would follow the
rule as to - ersonal ef ects. In order to have damages figured
for such injuries, the collision must be their proxi:vite cause,
and o.nly actual damages can be considered. What Puoy enter as
iteL of 1 ictue C~rs;e is: well illustrated by an early case. (b)
A skiff was run down and the libel'iant bo.Ay injured nr:d his
son drowned. The libellant's injuries were such- as to l-arti-
-a.i!'/ di~s,1e hivi for life. As damages the court allowed him
to recover for the injuries to .is skif f, fo loss of its use
while being repaired, expenses of his illness, loss of earnings
of hiimself and :oi. up to the time of the decree, com ensation
f'or nis sufferings and for is -rtia crrm ent disa3bility.
(a) Jacobson, v. Springer 7. F. Rep. 94U.
(b) viller, \. The 1W.o. Hughes, 1 Woods 6S3.
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No damages for tihe loss of the son's life were given.
Loss of Life.
For loss of life, by collision, the laws of admiralty
g:ive no right of' actimn and conseque-Itly :,c dnmageo mside from
some special act of Corigress or a law existing in the district
where tl:e coll1-ion occurred or the ship belonged. This was
finally decided in The Harrisburg, 119 U.S.199. That case
did not clearly decide however that when such. a statute existed
a Iersr;'.1 representative might bring an action for damages.
The reason for giving damages is that it is inequitable to
do otherwise, in the case of life negligently destroyed. In
the Harrisburg, Justice Wlaite answers this by saying that it
is the duty of' courts to declare thle law, not to make it.
That the law of maritime nations gives no damages aside from
statute is well settled. Congreoss has passed no statute upon
the subject. I seems that when su(h a question does arise
under a state statute that the damages would be sought in per-
sonam, unles; the statute especially made way for an action
in rem by giving a lien upon the s,:ip in fault. In a late
cace in the Circuit Court three seamen were drowned as a re-
sult of the vessel in fault not standing by according to
Admirnlty llsw. Damages were given, ti,.c aJvI-Js trators of
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the deceased,not for the loss of life, but for ,LO phylic-.
suffering endured before death. That the dnages accorded
were not to be taken a-- for the loss of life, vis expressly
stated. (a)
Previous to the decision of The l arrisbur,- there was a
strong tendency to disregard what Common law oi± the laws of
Admirity were as incorrorated into our legal system, and judg-
ment was given as the equities of the c~se seemed to Je!nald.
As most of the states have by statute provided a right of action
to be brou,.ht by tie personal representative of the deceased,
any equitable objections that miTht be raised, are rently
modified, the Supreme Court having not yet decided that an
action under such a natute my o  b mnintained in Admiralty.
Speakin: in general terms, all losses the direct consequen-
ce of a collision an d which may be measured with reasonable
certainty may be figured i, items of di e with the exception
of loss of life, unless -iven by some special statute. Wrat
will be looked upon as a direct loss has been indicated. If
in any case there are more tL n two vos..els in fault, the
(a) The Robert Graham Dun, 70 F. Rep. 270.
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damages will be ascessed -pro rata subject to the rules of limit-
ed liability. (a) If neither veiel i; in f'iJit, then no
damages are to be assebsed. (b).
(a) The Doris Eckchoff, 41 F. !l>. !5(.
(b) The Clara, 102 U.S. 200.
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LIABILITY.
Stating the rules broadly as to liability, the wrong doer
in a collision is liable for all the los. oc¢'c-2icsned by .is
neligerence. The common law rights of action being reserved,
the liability may be either that of the cormon law in personam
or the liability ascertained by an action ibn rem 2inst the
ship. In the common law action, every wrong doer is included
and may be held liable for damages. The action proceeds in
personam against the wrong doing owner or master or cl'arter
party as the case may be. In the action in rem the ship itself
is looked upon as the wrong doer and held liable. This further
difference betw,*een the liability at co.:mrion1 law an]d that in ad-
miralty must be noticed, namely, that at comr. on law any contribu-
tory neglgence on the plaintiff's part frees the defendant from
all liability, whl!e in - -tni-alty it divides the damages or if
very sligit on the part of one .-ay not af-ect 0 result at all..
if the owner is a wilful wrong doer, he will be held
liable not only for thelo loss to the full value of his own
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vessel, but for the entire damage2s actually suffered by tl~e
in-.ocont-- libellant, and no statute or rule of common law or
admiralty wil: aid him.
Subject to tbe statutory limitation of liability, the
innocent owner of a dama-ed ship may rccovor his ,Thole loss
from t.he parties in fault. If both are in fault, then but
half damages c n be collected. The cargo owner, also subject
to the same statutory regulation, may recover full damages,
holding the owners of either or both of the two vessels liable
for the injuries suffered. In a case wthere both are liable
and one has paid more than his share, sucr a ship owner flas a
remedy against the other for the amount paid over and above
what was Lis true liability.(a) This is also the case where
the damages are for loss of personal property or personal
injuries. If pending the suit, however, one of the ship owners
purchases the claims of the owners of his cargo, he is limited
in his recovery from the other snip to the amount paid for
them. The court will not force speculation of such a nature.
The cargo not being in fault c7nnot be held liable for the loss-
es on tine other vessel, except to the amount due for accrued
(a) The Dorris Eckhaff, 41 F. Rep. 156.
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freight. This is the case even if the c!,'ro owner ind the
owners of' the ship are one. If no statute of' limited liability
inte:fores,the cao ovner is entitled to a complete compensation
for his losses. (a)
Limited Liability.
But with this general statement concerning liability
must be taken into consideration the statutes limiting liability
in particular cases. These statutes frequently enter into a
case and entirely change the liability from what it would be
but for tiaeir existence. Section 4283, of the Revised Statutes,
limits the liability of a ship owner for loss by collision and
otherwise, when not occasioned by any priority or knowledge
of his, to the value of his interest in the ship and freight,
then pending. If a man has so acted as to come within this
limitati ;e is free fro.I all liability so far as the rest of
his property is concerned, no matter how great the loss. This
protects him from tiLe wrongful acts of others at whose mercy
his whole property might otherwise be placed . If there are
several owrneis, tc liability is to be apportioned between them
(a) The Bristol,29 F. Rep. 867.
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according to the interest each one has in the snip to blame
for the collzsion. Whether the owners are one or more the
greatest sum that can be collected from them, is the value of
the ship and its pending freight. By Section 4289, of the
Revised Statutes, the privilages gran"ted by Section 4283, were
not to apply to canal-boats, barges or lihters nor any other
vessel of any description used on rivers or in inland naviga-
tion. But, Section 4289, was substituted by Section 4, P.494,
of the supplement Vol.I., which removes thie limitation and
allows Section 4283 to apply to all the vessels formerly ex-
cepted. There seems no satisfactory reason why the exemption
from liability should not be applied to these last mentioned
vessels as well as to others.
From the fact that liability in such cases attah..es only
to the sip and the accruing freigit, it follows legally that
wvhen a sifip is a total loss the debt against her owners through
her ias ceased to exist. Dut the fact tilat one of the two
vessels is a total loss, while freeing it from further liability
does not in turn free the other vessel from its liability
toward the one so lost. In tne 'orti. Star, 106 U.S. 17, the
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section came up for interpretation on this point. Two vessels
collided and both were held in fault. One vessel was sunk, be-
coming thereby a total loss, while the other was only injured.
The damaged ship desired to avoid paying for any part of the
loss sustained by the othci- over and above its own injuries
and in support of that contention claimed theft as the vessel
sunk was freed from all further liability, that they, who were
only in equal fault,were also exempt. The court considered
this too broad an interpretation of the section, and held that
while the vessel sunk wasby force of the statutesfreed from
all furthe- liability, that, that fact did not exempt the sur-
viving ship from standing its share of the loss. In this case
the loss would be properly shared by the surviving ves-el pay-
ins the owner of the one sunk, half the difference between the
value of the vessel lost and the damages suffered by the other
ship. If in such a case one ship came under the section and
the other did not, the ownerso protected could claim its aid
vfnile enforcinC full liablility a-inst the owner of tLe other
vessel. The same method of equalizing damages a.1 lies in every
similar case coming under the statute, so long as half the
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combined damages of both does not exceed the value of the sthip
upon which tLey are imposed. If the ship has been a total loss,
in such a case it is looked upon as surrendered to the deep,
and t-,o owner is freed from liability. If the vessel in quest-
ion still has value, the complete yielJ1_ir up by tue owner of
his interests in the same absolves him from all further indebt-
edness. In this last caseit will be sufficient according to
Section 4285, if all interests are i:ut in the hands of a trustee
afi'ect on Wrolg. Doer.
This limitation of liability does not take away any remedy
against the wrong doer nor does it lessen any duty or respon-
sibility placed upon the vessel by law. It is not the laws
purpose here any more than elsewhere to protect those in fault,
but simply to lighten the burden otherwise placed upon innocent
ship owners. Th.is lirnitation applies against both cargo and
ship damaged by a collision under scn circumstaskccs. The
liability as to cargo is further restricted by a subsequent
act so most of the Jisoussion relatin- to such loss will be
reserved for tnat connection.
When AppIIed.
The limitation o' liability is not to be applied until
the balance of damages has be n struck. When botL vessels are
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in fault and both 'ile libels, the court may if it sees fit
consolidate the suits into one proceAding, and grant a single
decree. The innocent shippers or consigners of a caro may
proccel in rem or in personam , against either vessel or its
owner. Where a collision between two vessels has occasioned
damage to the cargo of a third snip not in fault, proceedings
may be had in rem against either one for the full loss. (a)
From this it appears that the limitation applies only to the
carrying ship. A party may plead that he is not liable at all,
but that if he is found liable request that he be allowed the
benefits oi Sections 4283 and 4285, of the Revised Statute.
Value When Taken.
But if a vessel which has been in a collision has a right to
the privilages of Section 4283, the following question arises,
when is the value to be taken. is it at the time of collision,
at the time of reaching the end of its voyage, or vi.-en sunk,
if it is so l6st? It has been shown that the owners liability
does not oxtond beyond the value of the ship after collision
and the freight then pending, but the time when that vralue is
to be ascertained will often make a groat difference. In the
City of Norwit, 118 U.S. 468, this question was fully discussed.
(a) The Atlas, 03 U.S. 302.
In this case a vessel was in fault tior a collision anJ. was
sunk. Later it was raised and repaired. The libellant cargo
o':vors rwanted to have the ships value taken as repaired. The
court Leld however that tlh value of tie s,,-ip was uslilly to
be taken at the end of the voyage,otherwise at the time of
si k1ki - Here the v ,,ya-e was never completed, so the ships
value was taken at the time it sunk. Had the vessel become a
total loss by the collision as would be tho case, if it sVrk
beyond recovery, nothing could be gained in a suit by the cargo
owners against the owners of the snip for at the time of taking
its value, the vessel was worthless. The respondents in this
case recovered insurance, but it was not lookei upon by the
court as such an interest in the snip as to be attach ble by
the orwners of' the c",r :o. Only the value of the ship when sunk,
and the freight actually earned could be considered. This lim-
ited liability is applicable to actions either in ren or in
personai,. TIP 7,wner of the injured ship must stand in the
same position as the owner of the damaged caro, so if the
funds realized are not sufficient to pay both, tney must share
pro rata. (a)
/,i) ,Iorwich Co., v. Wright, 13 Wall. 219.
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In another case tried at the same term of the Supreme
Court, as the City of' Norwich, the doctrine tiat the value of
the offending ship is not to be taken until-it completes its
voyage or is sunk, ift tho voyage is never completed, was carried
to an extreme length. In this case, "The Great Wiestern, 118
U.S. 520, the ship in fult was not materially injured by the
collision and startod on her voyage the same day, through her
own fault, in no way caused by injury received in the collision,
she went ashore and was wrecked. From the materials of the
wreck a small sum was realized. ir Insurance Company paid the
insurance on the vessel to its owners. The majority of t,'e
court held to the strict rule and would allow the cargo owners
and others to recover only the sun realized from the sale of
wreckage, the insurance remaining with the ship owners. A
minority of the court dissented vigorously on the ground that
the cause of the ships loss was its own subsequent negligence
and not the collision,and that in such a c,se the ships value
should not be allowed as at the time of sinking but at the time
it would iave completed its voyage but for such negligence on
its own part. The dissent seems fully as reasonable an
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interpretation as the prevailing opinion.
This liabilityr ol h vessel -ust be understood as arising
regardless of ownership. The liability attacheo v,'hen the col-
lision and injury occur. This is the case even when a compulso-
ry pilot has been taken aboard and the collision is due to his
fault. (a) In such a case of' compulsory pilotage t-e ship
owner is not liable in personamn but in rem.
Siinken Vessel.
It is necessary to consider the liability arising against
gn owner of a sunken vessel, when another snip collides with it
and is damaged and also the liability of the vessel colliding,
if any exists. In the first case, the gencral rule seems to
be that a ship owner may abandon his vessel when sunk and
incur no liability for a subsequent collision. Ceasing to
claim any property in the ship, tie loss has been caused by
nothing of his. Certainly no liability can then attach with-
out some special order being violated issued by the harbor mas-
ter or other competent authlorAties. So where a sunken canal-
boat was left by the o:,ner until ordered to be removed by thepilot
conmissioners, the owner was not liable for a collis-on with
the hulk before suck orders were reccived11. The law creats no
(a) The China, 7 Wall. 52.
general duty to remove a wreck. The harbor authorities may
remove one arid cniarce the owner for such removal aien he ',as
neglected to do so after being ordered to attend to it himself.
(a) If the owner does not elect to treat the vessel as a
wreck, it would seem only reasonable, if ' ni in a place wi.ere
collision would be apt to occur that some indication of its
presence be made, not only for the benefit of the ship sunk,
but in behalf of others as well. This has been su,2ested in
some cases. There being no regulation by Congress, such a re-
quireciet rould have to be local.
The ship colliding with a wreck will not be held liable,
unless, there are sufficient and proper signals to give warn-
ing of its presence. In a case, where 1. boat was sunk in a
narrow way through which ships were continually pasing and
repassii- 7h ,ourt said it was a reasonable obligation that
some signal of warning should be -iven of its presence, that it
might not be injured by collision, but that no prescrioed sig-
nals had boen fixed. (b) In this case the lights had been
(a) Ball v. Barwind, 29 F. Rep. b41.
(b) H.S. Nichols, 53 F. 665.
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displayed to locate the sunken boat, and then It was further
'ujarded by a vessel on watch. Here the boat was not abandoned.
As to what effect that would have had upon the question of
giving warning, the court does not say. The signals were placed
thiere to protect the sunken boat. Following the general rule,
the owner might iave abandoned the vessel without fear of lia-
bility for subsequent collisions. The respondent whio had in-
jured the sunken boat under such conditions was held liable
for damages arising from tie c<.llision. On his part, however,
it was a plain case of negligence. The light was seen find care-
lessly run into. In a case where only a mast stuck above water
to indicate the presence of a sunken ship, and a tug with an
injured vessel in tow ran into it because of the sheering of
the injured vessel, sufficient warning under the circumstances
was not considered to Lave been given , in order to render the
tug liable,in the fog which p-,evailed, the tug failed to see
the ships mast, until too late to avoia a collision. So while
there is no maritime duty to remove sunken vesiels, in order
to prevent owners from being liable, the duty of a ship under
way not to damage a sunken vessel is practically, the same as
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in the case of a ship at anchor if its whereabouts is properly
irndicated. The visible part of the ship or a light or buoy
to mark the spot will serve as the necessary signals to give
warning of its presence.
Coil IIion vith Anchor.
As to damages from colliding with an anchor which is un-
buoyed, it is held that,if the vessel whose anchor Las cause,
the injury was acting as ordinary vessels do on the anchorage
ground, no liability ensues. (a) The case iqplied that liabil-
ity would arise where such ordinary customs wei- not followed.
Claims Against the United States.
The rule as to claims against a United States vessel for
damages in a collision is op0posite to that of England. A claim
is allowed to be brought into the courts and if just to be
satisfied by suitable damages being given. Here however, none
of t ic u.sual proceedings against the vessel are allowed. The
Government is looked upon as the party liable. No costs can
be rendered against such a respondent. On this question The
Siren, 7'Wall. 152, is in point.
Fractional Liability.
The liability being ascertained, it is borne entirely by
one, if one alone is in fault, and usually by two or more equally,
(a) Baxter v. International Contracting Co., 65 F. Rep.250.
if more than one vessel is to blame for the coliisiol. But the
question arises must the two vessels in fault always share
equally as far as possible the damages caused by their combined
iiegligence, when one is not in fault nearly so much as the other.
There has been some strong dicta and also a few cases to the
effect that such a division does not necessarily follow. If a
division is allowed according to the negligence of each, it
will apply in principle whether any limited liability is pres-
ent or not. In settling a question of liability, however, both
would have to be taken into consideration in order that it
might be properly adjusted. In an early case, Ralston, v. State
Rights, Crabbe 22, it was said that the rule would not afjly
when the fault of the parties was "egregiously unequal". The
Continent, 103 U.S. 710, gives si Lilar dicta.
In the Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1., an action was brought for
personal damagds, after declaring that both were in fault, and
that dainages were to be divided the court says:
"Wilether in a case like this the decree should be for ex-
actly one half of tie damages sustained or might in the discret-
ion of the court be for a greater or less proportion of such
damages is a question not presented for our determination, upon
this record mU we expross no opinion upon it."
This dictum certainly seems very strongly in favor of not
always adhering to the strict rule of one half damages to each
of the two in f-ult. in the Victory v. The Plymothean, 68 F.
Rep. 395, a case arose in point. Two steamers collided in
broad daylight. One was coming up the side of the river chan-
nel lying on her port hand, which was contrary to law. The
other was proceeding down the river on the samo side accordin;r
to law. The vessels were in full sight of each other and there
was plenty of roon in the channel. The vessel going down sig-
naled, but the up coming steam-boat did not reply. Both vessels
kept their course and collided. Both were held in fault. One
for obstinately disre-arding the rules, the other for making
no effort to avoid the coliLsion which was meritable from their
course if continued. It was held that when as in this case
the fault of one vessel is extremely disproportionate to that
of the other the liability of each. may be measured by its con-
tributory share of negligence. The relative liability was
thought to be properly estimated in this case by making the two
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steam-coats siharc eq' ally the harm done to themselves, while
the ship most to blame, should also make :_i-ocd the loss to tne
cargo to the full value of the ship, then over to the other
for the remainder , iT any. This case carries out the spirit
of the dictum in "The Max Mor is"1 , and establisfles the rule in
the lower Federal courts, there sug-,cted, so far as damages
to fric-t are concerned. This tends to more truly make the
wrong doer liable for the reasonable consequences of his neg-
ligence than to divide the loss equally. The courts hesitate
to so divide, however, because of the long line of precedents
where damages have beer, equally divided and also fro m the fact
that it is not easy to accurately apply such fractional iia-
biliWy for necligence. 'However, it does not seem that diffi-
culty of application sholid -prevent the crurts from giving at
least appropriate justice. From the dictum in the ',ax Mforis,
and to riecision in The Victory, the riclht to award damages in
this manner seoms fairly well es'.ablishe 1. There is no de-
cision directly in point in the Supreme Court, since the ra:x
Morris.
Owners.
As to who may be looked upon as owners and thereby entitled
to this limited liability in a proper case, it is obvious that
those would be included who are commonly so classed, namely,
the holders of full or part title in the ship. There are also
statutory owners. The charter partiez of any ves:, el,who
victual and navigate her for a special trip,timeor purpose are
smch owners. C'-,arter parties are specially mentioned in section
4286, of the Revised Statutes as having th.e privilages of limi-
ted liability. Owners are also classed as general or special
according to the ihtereSt they may have in a sh.ip. So far as a
party is owner i~c comes in for his rights ,under a limited lia-
bility whether his ownership be that of a comnon owner or a
charter party.
Priority.
As to what constitutes priority oi' knowledge, the general
eanin:7, of the words indicate with sufficient clearness. W7here
an owner is n vigating the sip himself as master, he will be
deemed to have had a knowledge of the fault complained of.
History oZ.
As a historical fact, this idea of limited liability
originated in the Maritime law of Europe . The civil and common
law held owners responsible to the whole extent of damages
caused by the wrongful acts or negligence of the master or crew.
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The Maritime Law only held the owner thus liable when he was
personally to blame. If personally free from fault as when
he had placed the ship in the hands of a competent :iaster and
had equipped and manned it proporly, the owner's liability was
limited, both t :e amount of' his interest in the ship and
freight. By surrendering the ship, the owner became discharged
from liability as at present. It is from this ancient custom
of the i:,ritime law that Section 4283, arose . The purpose of
this exemption from liability was to encourage commerce. It
was thought people would be deterred from engaging in shipping
if they wore to be made indefinitely liable by the acts of
those sailing their vessels. An unscrupulous or careless master
or captain could otherwise easily ruin the ship' owner- So
the loss of ship and freight was looked upon as sufficient
liability to place upon an innocent owner-
The statutory limitation of liability so far cosidered
limits the liability for damages arising from a collision and
other ways sP, ecified to the v-ilue of the ship when there is
no priority or knowledge on thc L-art of t,e ower- This li-.ii-
tation, however, is not to be looked upon as taking away any
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rijht of action or remedy against a master, other officer, or
crew q;i-en they are wrong doers, nor as lessening any duty or
responsibility laid upon ti.e owner by law. The statutory
provision for limited liability, just considered applies to
liability for both ship and cargo injured. The next act to
be noticed affects only the cargo on the carrying ship and
such -i sh-ips consequent liability. The act so limiting is the
Harter Act.
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HARTER ACT.
The Harter Act, 27 Statutes at Large, P. 445, limits still
further the liability of an owner of a vessel. Section 3, siy5:
"That if the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise
or property to or from any port in the United States of America
shall exercise due diligence to make said vessel in all respects
seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and supplied, neither
the vessel nor her owners,agont or charterers shall be respon-
sible for damages or loss resulting from faults or errors in
navigation or management of said ves. elnor shall the vessel,
her owner or owners, charterers or agent,or master be held lia-
ble for losses arising from dangers of the sea or other naviga-
ble waters,acts of God,or public enemies,or the inherent defect,
quality or vice of the thing carried or from insufficiency of
package or seizure urider legal process,or for loss resulting
from any act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods his
agent or representative or from saving or attempting to save life
or property at sea or for any deviation in rendering such service.
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This act as a w±;ole is to be looKed upon as a compromise
betweon t!e cr-,::on carrier on water and the owner of goods
calried. The first part of Section 3, includes the most of
what is directly in point in a case of collision. In the first
place., it r ust be understood that this section applies only to
cargo on Ooard and not to pas -enkcr2 -e ba,7gae not shipped
as cargo. So if a passenger is injured or baggage destroyed
in a collision, caused as indicated in the above section, the
liability remains just the same, as before the ict vas passed.
One or both ships, make good the loss sustained according as
one or both are in fault.(a) Further, the section is to be
understood as applying only to the cqyin- vessel and its
cargo, and not to the other ship and cargo in collision. The
principle that when both are in fault, damages must be divided
and tile innocent cargo owner recover his whole loss from either
vessel is to be followed as closely as possible consi6tcn t with
the act.
By this section, it is not to be understood that there is
any intent to rolcase one vessel at tne expense of the other.
(a) The Posendale, 88 F. Rep. 324.
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Th.e liability of t: nther ship remains unchanged, if not
directly benefited by the section.
No Offset.
Tihis sct,*ion :ives no right of offset against the carry-
ing vessel. That would,if allowed, create an indirect liabil-
ity for part at least of' the loss accruin& to the cargo under
the above circumstances. Such an offset would be given, if
when two ships have been in collision anJ both were in fault,
the vessel which was not carrying the cargo should be allowed
to set-off against the carrying vessel, damages up to one rnalf
of tie nalf damages it had been obliged to pay for the cargo
injured. But the cases distinctly deny that any sucl interpre-
tation was intended by those framing the act.
Owner's Liabil ty.
The liability of the vessel and owners, is not lessened
except in respect to the cargo on board the carrying ship.
Otherwise it remains tile sa me as by Section 4283., and 4285 of
the Rcvised statutes and Section 18, P. 4,C3, of the Ist.Vol. of
the Supplement. The cargo owners must stand cr.arged under this
act with so much of the damages to the cargo as the carrying
ship is relieved from, in so far as that is necessary to pre-
vont arky increasing of tne liability of the other vessel.
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A good exa mple of the ;working of this statute, is seen
in The Niagara, 77 F. Rep. 329., wuiere the act iS carefully
discussed. Two vessels collided in a fog. Both were found in
fault. The Hales was a complete loss, both ship and cargo,
while tLe Niagara was but slightly injured, in ship and none in
cargo. The Hales was worth $16,000, and her cargo $2G,000.
The Hales was looked upon as coming within the influence of
the Harter Act, section 3. Damages bein' divided as to the
ship's loss, the Hales received $8000. But for the act, the
cargo owner for whom the Hales was the carrying ship could get
the $ 8000 to make good is damages. As it was, by force of the
act, the $8000 must be nis loss. Having apart from the act,a
riht to sue either offending vessel for his full damages
suffered, he could recover from the Niagarf $ 8,000, but no
more, as a greater amount would increase the burden upon that
vessel making it .eavier, because of this section, which was
not deemed to be its intent. S o the burden of loss, to the
extent of the $8000., fell on the cargo owner. In this way tho
liabilities of the Niagara was not increased. But for the
statute, the money that went to pay the sales' half dnmages for
total loss would have been paid to the cargo owner. The
carr'ier's burden is t;.erefore, made lighter by means of this
Act. The Viola, 60 F. Rep. 296, is one of the first cases upon
Section 3.
In the Ircrawaddy, 171 U.S. 187, the force of the Harter
act was considered where a general aver-e had arisen. It was
decided that the Act did not let the offending ship into a
general average with the cargo the same as for sacrifices sub-
sequent to stranding or colliding. The main purpose of the
act is to relieve the ship owner from liabijity for latent
defects not discoverable by the utmost care and diligence,
and in the event that he has exercised due diligence to make
his vessel seaworthy to exempt him fro- responsibility for loss
due to errors in navigation, but not to allow tiLe owner of the
guilty ships to skare in a .eneral average.
Having shown the general effect of the Act, Section 3, the
interpretation of so-me special pLases may make its meaning more
clear. The words "to or from any Yort in the United States",
apply not only to vessels going to or from or between such ports
as New York and Boston,but as well to ships plying between two
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places on the same bay. It is given "a broad construction
mid a-plies to all vessels carrying mercLandise to or from any
port under Federal Government jurisdiction." Such a case arose
in San Francisco Bay. (a) Whether due dilligence i-s benr
exercise1 in any case to make the vessel"seaworthy etc.',' is a
question of fact to be decided in each instan-e as it arises.
A vessel is properly manned. if a sufficient and competent crew
is aboard, though at the time of collision, a lookout may not
be in his place or a proper officer on deck. Equipment and
supplies are sufficiently provided if the ship is properly
equipped and supplied on starting out, and possessed of a
reasonaole amount of material with which to repair. As an ex-
ample a mechanical fog-iLorn is out of order, and a collision
ensues. If the owners furnished a proper horn and material
to repair it with, if needed, they have properly equipped the
ship in that respect, and may come under the Statute. Whether
or not the loss caused was due to a fault or error in navigration
or managemer,t of - vessel is also a question that must be de-
cided in each insta1ice aided by the rules and fixed customs of
(a) In re Piper,etc., Co., 86 F. Rep 670.
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the seas, harbors, rivers or lakes, where the case arises.
.. either t'P limitations of liability under the sctons
of the Revised Statutes nor the Harter Act ern be looked upon
as allowing a ship to exempt itself by contract from liability
for its owrn negligent acts causing a collision and damage to
cargo. Such contracts are looked upon as contrary to public
policy, and the court will not enforce them, but hold the
coint2acting vessel responsible for its negligence.(a) This
is simply a setting forth of the gerieral rule in respect to
coTmmon carriers, on land or water-
(a) The Guildhall,58 F. Rep. 796.
PRIORITY OF LIENS.
Having discovered the liability of a ship for damag-es
arising from a collision, it is next necessary to consider the
nature of that liability.
Nature of Lien.
Dj ..iages having been proved for wnich the respondent vessel
is liable, a lien attaches to the ship in favor of the injured
and successful libellant. This lien attaches to and follows
the negligent ship wnerever sre -oos. This maritime lien is
enforced by an action in rep. Throughout an action for the en-
forcement of a lien, the ship is treated as the offending party
and arrested by tl-e order of the Court. The lien attaches not
only to tihe ship, but also to her tackel, furniture an.- freight
earned at the time of collision. The lien following a vessel
ai it does wenever the same may go, is just contrary to the
force of - lien at Common law where it is lost as soon as out
of possession which would usually consist in bein,- out of port.
Form of Atio.
The nature of the proceeding in rem is as elsew.ere, a
proceedkin. against the res, the ti.ing, the siiip, whicl accounts
for the arrest of the vessel itself. In Common Law Courts it
97.
has been the custom to treat vessels as person; l .rceorty, sub-
ject to attacl.ment and execution, but, liniting sui.t to tre
persons wiiose legal ri~i'ti have been affected and those w1.o
nave invaded those rigri.ts. in Chancery,ll interested in
the suit are included. But in Admi-rait:, ali wLo have an
interest in thie subject of the action, the res, may independ-
ently appear mn propound his suit. To ;iv juri.sAiction in
rem, there must i-ave been an actual and valid seizure of the
ship by the -iarsnall of the court.
Priority Determined.
Having such a lien upon a ship,arising from a collision,
whichI can be thrus enforced, it becomes necessary to know what
relation it bears to other liens of the sane or a different
nature: First, as to liens of the same nature. Two liens
at+.ach for damages to the ship and cargo, caused by a collision,
in wnich the same vessel was an offending party. If they arose
at the same time, and are of the same nature, those 1.cldinz
them, must be looked upon as possessed of equal ri;L ts against
the silip in fault. If one is prior in time to the other, the
junior lien, tinougn otherwise tLe s:e, -ast :Live way to that
which is senior provided that no sucd time has passed as to
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deprive the possessor of the prior lien of his right of action.
(a). But where the contention is one of priority as between
liens of a different kind, many questions arise as to which
shll take precedence. Priority in any given case, is to be
determined always by ascertaining the liens nature, unless they
are found to be of the same nature, then the one first in time
has preference as previously indicated. It is intended here
only to consider the priority of such liens as would usually
arise when a collision has occurred.
Damage Lien.
The lien usually most prominent in all collision cases, is
that for damages. To determine its priority is therefore of
first importance. In doing so the other liens will of necessity
be discussed, thereby giving the priority of them all. Over
what other liens a damage lien should take precedence there has
been some conflict of decisions. That damages should have pref-
erence over a lien for repairs, ti-lere is no great doubt. (b).
There was for a time some dissent to this, but it (c) has been
(a) The Frank G. Flower, 17 F. Rep. 653.
(b) The Pride of the Ocean, 3 F. Rep. 161.
(c) The Amos L. Carver, 35 F. Rep. 665.
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OVer-rued by the . courts, and disregarded by subsequent
decisions Oy courts of the same authority. It also t'>kes pre-
cedence over mortgage liens,bottomry and respondentia Oonds.
In the J.G. Stevens, 40 F. Rep. 331, it was held that a mari-
time lien for damages arising from a collision takes precedence
of liens for repairs and supplies, although the latter liens
arose prior to the disaster. The court here refused to follow
the Amos D. Carver. The reason for !-ivin.: such a lien preced-
ence is that the person suffering the damages has no option to
omploy arid no caution ' hich it is possible to exercise which
the creditor on n mortgage,bottomry or respondentia bond has.
Such a creditor may con_,ider all the possible risks and ad-
vance n:is money, material or supplies accordingly. He Las an
alter]ative while the libellant for collisicn damages, has none
at all, the damages bei-W forced upon him by the negligence of
others. Such a preference is renerally Lad over all ex contractu
relations. It is to be further ioticed that the fact tiit t1o
libellant is also sorec:hat in fault, will not have any affect
on the priority of such damaces as -(,as a r' -nt to collect
despDite such neglect. (a). These decisions leave no doubt as
(a) The Jonn G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113.
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to the priority of damage liens over those for prior repairs,
supplies, money loaned with a mortage as security and in gener-
al all liens ex contrictu except wf: -es.
Whether or not a damage lien should take precedence over
one for seaman's wages was for a time vigoroizsly dispited. The
previous decision of' the Supreme Court did not satisfy some
judges, as being in accordance witi. mar1ti.ie law. in Norwich
Co., v. Wright, 13 Wall. 210, it had been laid down that pref-
erence should be Eiven to the damage lien. In the Amos Z.
Carver, 35 F. Rep. 665, Justice Brown did not follow the pre-
vious Supreme Court decision, but instead g-ve preference to
the lien for mariner's wages. In The Daisy Day, 40 F. Rep. 538,
it was held that : maritime liei- for damages, arising from a
collision caused by negligent towage must yield to i lion for
seaman's wages, if the seamen were not in fault. The Court
distinctly refused to follow 1orwich Co., v. Wright, which plac-
ed damage liens first, because the Jecision was considered
contrary to tliC Admiralty law of the United States. This
agreed with the decision in The Amos D. Carver. There was here
an implied holding that if the seamen were in fault that this
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prefcrerce wo.Ild not exist. Iin two later Federal cases, the
courts took a different position. In these cases, The F.H.
Stmiwood, 49 F. Rep. 577, and The Nettie Woodward, 50 F. Rep.
224, it wta held that a maritime lien for damages arising from
a collision caused by negligent nn,,igation, had precedence
over a lien of tlhe crew of the offending vessel for wages earn-
ed 1.rior to tiie collision, but subordinate to their liens for
wages earned on board subsequent to it. The lien for wages,
does not apply merely to mariners who serve the ship with peculiar
nautical skill, but extends to all whose services are in fur-
therence of the main object of the enterprise in which the ship
is engaged, such as engineers, deck-hands, firemen, captain,
mechanics, carpenters, porters and others. In the conflict
of decisions on this question of priority of damage liens over
those for mariner's wages, the later c?-ses as well as the
majority of them seem to give precedence to the lien for damaeo;,
to do so is certainly carrying out more strictly the idea that
a seaman's fortunies follow those of his ship. If his ship is
in the wrong, he must wait until th.ose wrongs i:,ve beern proper-
ly copensated. As a rule, lions for seaman's wages also take
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precedence ovor claims ex:-contractu. The reasons for this con-
sist in the general reckless itature of sC-PCe', the ease with
which they are imposed upon, and a desire to save theic wages
for them. The reasov why their wages earned prior to the acci-
dent should give place to the lien for dmageos s,,F...r. by
ship and cargo in a collision, rest ulpon two grounds. First,
the seamen are usually in some degree to Olame for the acts of
the offending vessel, so from considerations of public policy,
it is sought in this way to discourage negligence on their part
while navigating. Second, it would be inequitable to permit
a fund impouride' to compensate for a wrong, to be deserted to
the pay,,ment of a participant in the wrong or to one having a
remedy against the owner of the offending vessel denied to the
owner of ti.e shil', dfttia-d. In The F.H. Stanwood, the owner had
no remedy other than that of a lien against the offending vessel
because of the effect of thelimited liability given by Revised
Statutes, 4283. There the above reasoning strictly applied.
Adniraltr L~w follows the doctrines of equity so far as it is
possible. It is a settled principle of equity tiat wrhere one
party has but one remedy and the other has several that the
latter will be remitted to his additional remedy and not be
allowed to select the only remedy the first person has, when
by so doing a just claim would in whole or in part be left un-
satisfied. Following this principle the mariner would be ob-
liged to yield to tho lien for d-maes, so far as his lien
against the ship would in any way conflict with an injured li-
bellantb ri hts. Justice Brown who had taken the opposite view,
later recognized the weight and authority of the decisions as
stated above. So the doctrine laid down in Norwich Co., v.
Wright, 13 Wall. at 122, seems to be clearly sustained by the
latest decisions in the Federal Courts. What the Supreme Court
would do with the question, if it arose there again, does not
appear, but it seems reasonable to suppose that it would follow
its previous holding which gave priority to the injured libel-
lant. It was thought in the F.H. Statwood that the decision
in the Daisy Day, as to mariner's wages being -iven precedence
where the crew was not to blame, would have been different, had
the case of The J.G. Stevens then been decided and brought to
the notice of the court. The rule thus deduced is that the lien
for mariner's wages rives way to the lien for damages so far
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as wa-os earned on board the offending ship, prior to the col-
lision are concerned, and tLat the wages take precodence, if
earned after the loss. The question as to the crews not being
at all in fault raises but little doubt, since they .ave other
remedies.
Salvage Lion.
As to all other liens that might possibly attach to a
ship, there se 1is no roo'n for any other conclusion than that a
lien for damages caused by negligent navigation takes preceden-
ce in every case, except in that of Salvage. Two ships collide
and daia, age ensutes. Both of the vessels are injured. The vessel
not to blame, and also the goods it carries h.ive a lien upon
the offendin- vessel. But a salvar also has a lien upon the
same vessel. It may have existed at the time of collision
for some previous act of salv~a,-, or it -ay accrue after the
collision and be due to damages suffered thereby. Practically
the only difference, the fact that the salvage lien wac. prior
in time could possibly make would be if the two liens were ever
looked upon as of equal importance. If sucl was t.e cvse -.ere
the older lien must as elsewhere, have priority unles,; by laches
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such a benefit had been lost. But aside from such a supposed
condition of things arising from the possibility of the two
liens being considered of' equal importance, an answer to one
case would be a]rpro riate to the other. The Salvor's lien
seems to be one of the most highly t'avorc d. But for i.is inter-
ference, there often would have been nothing for the liens of
other parites to attach. This would always be the case where
the liability of the vessel in fanit is satisfied by its total
loss, and but for the salvor's assistance, such a loss would
have occurred. The salvor often displays grent bravery, risk-
ing -is own life in saving the property or lives and property
of others. That such bravery or ever, any act, saving the prop-
erty of others should be made sure of its reward, certainly
seems most just and reasonable. By the holding in thie Nettie
Woodward, salvage liens and liens for damages were put on the
same basis so far as their priority over mariner's w'vves was
concerned. Both must give place to wages earned subsequent to
the collision. While no case directly in point appears, the
general tone of the cases seem to give s!. vage services a prior
lien over every other, except that of mariner's wages
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subsequently e'i.rned. Froi the conditions under which the ser-
vices are rendered and the necessary adva -itae acer'i. _W there-
by to other lien holders as well as from the general tone of
the cases, it would sexn thAt a salvage lien should be given
such priority unless in some way rest-ictea by contract or lachesA
General Averag.
General Average may be recovered as damages from the wrong
doing vessel. As such a condition of things may arise and be
of considerable importance in a collision case, it should be
here considered as a lien and its priority. A case of General
Average w.ould iave occurred where a vessel after being in
collision without fault was obliged to cut away broken spars
or jettison part of the cargo in order to keep the ship afloat.
This beli-, :o, for the common safety of ship and cargo, would
demand that a general average be hsJ, average char,-os incurred
by a cargo owner may be recovered as damages caused by collision
and a lien for such charges attaches. Like all other liens,
it must give preference to mariner's wages earned subsequent to
the collision. It certainly takes precedence over a botto,,ry
bond, and rioney lent to pay it may have the same priority as
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the lien which it paid.(a) Such a lien by the ship in colliS-
ion cases usually becomos absorbed as part of the damages suf-
ferod and takes place along with a lien for damages. If by
the cargo owner, the lien would probably take a similar position,
as it repr'cIts dam-aes sustained by him. In a case where a
lien for direct damages and one for general average expenses
were brought against the same vessel, there seems no reason why
one should not have the same priority righ ts as the other, if
both arose from a collision. 1f the general average was not,
the result of a collision, but arose in some other way, as by
reason of a storm, it would seem that what ever preference was
given, should be to the damage lien arising, because of the
negligence of the ship upon wlaich it at-aches, rather thln to
the averaze lien which arose as much for the protection of the
holders prop erty as or the one who threw it overboard in aid
of common safety.
The courts in discussing the advisability of allowing
average charges as damages have said that there seems no sound
reason why both general and particular average charges should
(a) The Dora, 34 F. Rep. 3.
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not be recovered as a part of the damages. They are a direct
result of the collision, for witliout it they would not have
occurred. The rule of damages is said to be "restitutio in
integram. Such a rule clearly demands compensation for such
charges arising as they do directly from the collision. (a)
The same might be said in substance concerning a lien for re-
pairs or for salvage services, for being paid such liens become
items in the amount of damages suffered. Some special atten-
tion has been -iven to this matter in conn:ection with general
average, because of the energy with which at times it Las been
opposed as entorin; an& forming a part of the damages. This
satisfactorily answers the case where both1 arise from the col-
lision, but as to the case where the average lien stands bold-
ly out by itself, the courts are not so clear. It would seem
that such a lien must yield to one for damages for the reason
previously given.
Repairs.
A vessel having suffered damagc in a collision and been
repaired, a lien attaches to her for her value of repairs
(R) The Energid, 66 F. Rep. 604.
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rendered. This lien is not lost by merely delivering the ves-
sel to the owner before the payment. It is in the nature of
a prorrietary right, and follows a vessel until such a time
has lapsed as will be looked upon as marking its etinguishment.
Generally speaking, such a lien must yield to a lien for sal-
vage, damages by collision, mariners wages, general average or
bottomry and respondentia bonds. This is sho%%rn by casos pre-
viously cited in another connection. (a) The Felice while not
a case wnere a coliision had occurred is a good illustration
of the law on ti-he question. After admitinr the general rule
that a bottomry bond lien would have preference, the case hold
that such- priority would not be given where the holder of the
bond has been guilty of delay in enforcing it or of some action
tending to induce repairs to bc given by which the value of
'the s1ip hial been greatly increased. By this it may be seen
that these rules concerning priority of liens may be rendered
insufficient because of outside circumstances. On the other
hand, lions for repairs take precedence over a lien for unpaid
(a) The Pride of the Ocean, 3 F. Rep. 161.
The J.G. Stevens, 40 F. Rep. 331.
The Felice, 40 F. Rep. 653.
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preliums of inslirance, and are on the same footing with a lien
for supplies furnished in a homo port , 1 en tne repairs were
given in a foreign port. If the mastor is personially l ble,
the lien for repairs takes precedence over the lion for the
master's wa-os,(a) also over towage, where it is for towing
an injured vessel, but if the services had been rendered to
a vessel injured by a collision so as to need such services
more than would usually bo t.e case, they would probably be
classed as salvage services and take priority. In short, the
cases seem to show that a lien for repairs has priority over
all other liens exce Ut those mentioned above as taking preced-
ence, or at most only yielding an equal right to others unless
laches have occurred.
These four classes of Admiralty liens arising from dm'yes,
to ship and cargo, salvage services, general average and a
lien for repairs are teho only liens of importance that are
liable to arise from a collision. Others may attach, but as
a rule they could all be brought under one of these cncral
heads, and their priority deterlinted t.creby. The relation as
(a) The Daisy Day, 40 F. Rell. 5, B.
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to priority in these four cases seems to be Salvage services
first, Damages second, General Average third, and ropiirs to an
injured siiip, fourth.
As between Maritime and Domestic liens, the former must
always have priority.
Divesting of Liens.
These liens may lose their priority or become entirely
divided in several ways. Proper payment of R lien of course
always discharges it. A lien may also be extinguished or lose
its priority by laches. The priority lost would be as against a
subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith. The laches
may however, be excused if explai-ned in a satisfactory manner-
A lien may also be divested by a judicial sale of a vessel,or
an action in rem, or by a private sale justified by necessity.
Also by a taking of collateril security under a special agree-
ment to divest, and finally by a destruction of the vessel. In
this last case, the destruction may be complete as w:.on totally
burned or lost at sea, or it may only be a destruction of' the
ship as sucl., the ccnponent parts still existing, but built
into another structure. In either case the lien is lost.
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A lien is not divested when a delay is excused,nor when
a private sale is not justified by necessity, nor by taking
commercial paper for it whicrI turns out worthless. A vessels
departure from port does not divest any lien, except wharfage,
so far as it has a standing in Admiralty. :1or does a lien di-
vest by an assignment of the claim. The rigiht to enforce the
lien is simply changed from.i one to another- As there is nothing
peculiar about a lien's divesting connected with it because
arising from a collision, it does not seem necessary to discus.;
the matter here, more than to show generally, as has been done,
the conditions under which liens will and will not divest in
Admiralty. All Admiralty liens have i-ot been discussed, but
only those which would be most likely to arise in collision
cases.
State Liens.
It remains to say a few words concerning liens given by
State Statutes and tiheir relation to Adyiralty liens arising
from collisions. Concerning these leins it is neces-ary to
observe that none can be thus given which will in any way
1i.
interfere with liens in Adr-iralty. T tl~e lien so conflicts,
the domestic or State lien must yield priority to ali liens
maritime. T! not in such conflict, a stpte lien may be enforced
in Admiralty, but it cani have no place except at the foot when
priority is considered. These local or State lien laws are
not regarded as amendments to the general maritime law. How-
ever, in the absence of a- act by Congress establishing a uni-
from rule in such cases, and also in the absence of any con-
flict between them and the laws of Admiralty, they vii be up-
held as against vescls engaged in foreign and interstate com-
merce, owned in other states as cell as against I.s owned
withmin the State. (a) It was the Constitutional intent to have
a harmonious system of' rulec for all Admiralty cases, collisions
and otherwise, so in order to be consistont with that intent,
the above aprlication of State laws must be adhered to.
A lien by State Statute is lost by t e departure of the
vessel from port, the same as at Common Law. At Comcheri law
a lien for damages by collision has long existed.
(a) The Del Notre, 90 1. Rer =
TUG AND TOW.
Many collision cases arise w:uere a tug and tow are either
parties libellant or respondent. The collision m _,y c(.,ur be-
tween the tug and tow themselves, or between one of them and
some t1-ird vessel or object. One, both or neither may be lia-
ble as in any case of collision. The tow may be under full or
partial control of the tug. Where it is under the full control
of the +; and a collision occurs, the presumption is in favor
of the tow against the tig. The tug having control of the tow's
movements it is only reasonable to presume that a collision
occurred through its fault. However, this presumption is re-
butabie, as by showing thiat the fault was some act of the tow
or some outside force over wnich the tug could not reasonably
be expected to have control. A tug in control of the tow is in
duty bound to anticipate the time and place and perils of the
ordinary action of the tide or well known river currents. The
tug also will be liable for so passing another vessel tijat the
tow becomes disturbed by the suctioh of the wheel of the ship
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passed and collision occurs, or in any other way causes a
dangerous situation to arise from which damage to the tow or
to the tow and a third vessel accrue. (a) Where the control
of the tug and tow is divided equally or practically so, it
would seem that between themselves no fault would arise against
either-
Full Control.
The tow mn y be in full control, using the tug merely as
its motive power, as an agent for that purpose. In such a
case if tug and tow collide, certainly no presumption of fault
can arise against tho tu , but rather against the tow, which
was in control of the movements of both ships.These general
principles laid down as applying when the tug and tow collide
with each other also apply in any case of collision where a
tug and tow is concerned and an at emipt is bein; made to fix
the liability upon one or the other- Both beinS in faultlia-
bility falls upo,'i both.
Are One Vessel.
In Admiralty law, tug and tow are looked upon as one vessel,
when a third s iip is injured and their fault not being explained,
both are liable in damages which will be divided between t201.
(a) The !-'ariel, 32 F. Rep.103.
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The showing that one or the other was in full control, seems
to shift the burden of proof. Not only are the tug and tow to
be looked upon as one ship in law, but it seems that they are
to be considered as a steam-ship. The propelling power is
steam, so the ship must come within tfie gencral definition of
a steam vessel. A tug and tow must keep out of the way of a
sailing vessel as would a steam ship, but the same strict ac-
count of liability is not required. An adherence to the rules
for steam ves.els is demanded with a reasonable amount of con-
sideration given for the necessary difficulties attendant upon
such navigation. Where a tug and tow meet a schooner, the
schooner is not freed from all care. She too, must look out for
herself, and take such precautions as the circumstances re-
quire. The tug is not in all cases held to the strict respon-
sibility of a vessel under steam with movements unimpeded.
Where the sailing vessel comes needlessly near or tries to cut
across the tow, the tug can not be held to blame, being unable
to escape. (a)
Tugz Unnecessarily Encumbered.
If the tug itself unnecessarily increases the inconvenience
(a) The Page, 36 F Rep. 329.
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under w-lich it is placed by tile presence of a tow, it must use
a commensurate degree of care according to the risk assumed.
An example of this would be where a tow was very long and in
consequence it was impos.;ible to as readily avoid a collision.
in such a case, the tug often wishes to raise t.:e increased in-
convenience as a defense, but it is not allowed to do so, having
itself needles:31:r created the extra impediment to its naviga-
tion. (a) When a third vessel has boo, to blame the tug will
only be required to show that it has done its duty and fulfill-
ed its contract of towage toward the tow. This, however, in
no way excuses the tug and tovr fron using every precaution
under the circumstances. This is true even though t.e fault
of the Offending vessel is flagrant. (b)
In order to hold a tug liable for damages done to or by
its tow, it must actually or impliedly have assimed the con-
trol of towage. So in a case when a tu- had two boats in line,
and without its knowledge a third boat attachez itself to the
tow so unskilfully as to soon break away and collide with the
(a) The H.N. 'gnitney, 86 F. Rep. 697.
(b) The Maria Martin, 12 Wall. 31.
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libellant's vessel, no liability can rest upon the tug. A con-
tract to tow had not been assumed even implied by such a case,
is alone to blne. (a).
Part Control.
Wnen both tug and tow are in partial control of their
movements, and a coliLsion with some third ship occurs, both
may be held liable. If both tug and tow had clear olportunity
to avoid a steamship or other vessel and t:ne tug did nothing
to prevent the collision and the tow in no way objected to the
course taken or in any other manner took{ any precautions, both
will be looked upon as liable unless the apparent fault can be
explained.(b) As a general rule it may be said that if the
tow sees or ought to iave seen and objected to the course of
the tu. and did not, it will be looked upon as having acquiesced
in the negligent acts of the tug, whenever another vessel has
been damaged. thereby. Where trie crews o.' both tug and tow par-
ticipate in the navigation of the two ships, both may be sued
and, if found in fault, held liable the same as though they
were ships navigating separately. The damages are divided
(a) Steamboat Co., v. Steamboat Co., 32 F. Rep. 798.
(b) A. Chase, 31 F. Rep. 91.
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between the-r, with the umderstanding that if one is not able
to pay its share of the damages the other must. (a) Tug and
tow may however, always be sued as one vessel, and, if either
is innocent, that one may be freed froi responsibility. (b).
When the crews act jointly in navigating the tug and tow, it
is sufficient to show that the collision occurred by their
negligence while so acting, in order to hold both liable.
Agents of' each vestel are implicated in the negligence complain-
ed of, thereby rendering their ship re31nnsible.
Tow in Control.
Tnae only cases where a tow can be held in fault having
been properly accepted by the tug are when some control of the
navigation remains in its hands. This is the case when a
master or pilot is left on board or the crew as mcntioneQ abovQ.
or where the tow herself attended to the fastening of the tow
line, or the snifting of the sails, or when she is proceeding
partly under her own steam. The tow's liability may be complete
or only partial as above indicated. Examples of where it is
complete are such as the Carfloat, No. 4, 89 F. Rep. 877. In
(a) The Virginia,97 U.S. 309.
(b) The Restless, 103 U.S. 699.
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this case, a steam ship _came up to a wharf under Ier own steam
and in charge of her own pilot, assisted by tugs. Because of
her recklesness the steamship collided with a carfloat and
sunk it. There was sufficient freedom to permit sliiu independ-
ent action as was necessary to create a collision by her own
act, aid no fault was shown on the part of the tugs. In the
Law 26 F. Rep. 164, the master of the libellant tow handled her
sails improperly which caused the ship to go wrong. The tug
was in no way liable. The tow having seen fit to so set her
own sails must stcind the results of her fault.
Suit by Tow.
When the tow is attempting to recover for its damages, it
may sue the t,, alone or tne tug and any third ship in fault.
The tow in such a case is not bound by the tug'vs acts as those of
an agent. If it happens that the tow of one tug coLides witL
the tow of another, both tugs may be libelled in the same pro-
ceeding, but the burden is upon thej libellant to establish neg-
ligence against both. As against the tug not its own the tow
thus suing, cn be in no better position than its own tug would
be , if bringing the action. This is not on the grounds of
agency, but because of the fact that in law, tug and tow are
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looked upon as one vessel. So to the extent her tug is in
fault, the tow cannot recover against the other vessel. (a).
Breaking of Tur and Tow.
In cases of sudden peril, when anything about the tug and
tow breaks in attempting to avoid collision, no presumption
is raised against the t1i ayid tow from that fact. A tug is
towing by a "bridle" which breakes under a sudden strain caused
by the tug's starboardinz to avoid an approaching vessel.
The tug ii not looked upon as acting in a way of itself danger-
ous in using a "bridle", so proof will be required to show that
it was insufficient. The "bridle" snapping only in an emergen-
cy, it will be presixmed to have been strong enougx for general
use.(b). The fact that the lashings between tu; and tow along
side gave way when a tug stop1 ed suddenly to avoid the libellant
ship which had placed itself in the same manner. The fault is
that of the ship in placing the tug and tow in such a position
as to demand unusual action, causing extra st-ain on the
lashings. (c) On the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River,
(a) The L.P. Dayton, 120 U.S. 37.
(b) The Zouave, 90 F. Rep. 440.
(c) The Sa.nr-ie, 29 F. Rep. 923.
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towage is more important thai elsewiierc, and in consequence,
special attention is paid to it in the rules of navigation for
thfat portion of American waters.
With the understanding that tug and tow are in law, one
vessel, and that a steam vessel, not held with the full rigor
of a steam vessel unimpeded, and that a collision occuring with
the tow, tLe tug rather than the tow will 'Do presumed to be in
fault. The rest of the law governing tug and tow in collision,
nay be found ou tne following principles laid down for other
collison cases.
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
In Admiralty as in Equity, the Statute of limitations is
governed by what a reasonable man ought or would have done in
a given case rather than by any fixed limit. In most cases
the limit will be looked upon as passed much sooner than the
time fixed by special statutes of law. The Statutes of limi-
tations of the states, have no application in cases where a
maritime lien has ariseii the action being one i rem. Actions
arising from collisions have in this respect nothing peculiar
about them aprirt from other actions in Admiralty, so it will
be sufficient to treat them generally. While the period of
limitations is usually much shorter than at common law, it may
under special circumstarces be equal to it in length or even
longer. However, this period of lirmitatior of action should
not be extended beyond the coimon law limit, except for some
partisl or complete inability to sue, or for some peculiarity
of a maritime nature, that dcmands recognition by an admiralty
court and makes it plainly a matter of justice that this dis-
cretion be applied. A case where such an extention of time
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might be granted would be when the ves-cl in fault for a collis-
ion has escaped and it has not been possible to get it within
the courts jurisdiction for a time longer than the period of
common law limitations. It seems that the time is not to be
extended beyond the common law period of limitations in the
discretion of the court, except in the above cases.(a) So
where the owners of a vessel lost by collision delayed needless-
ly over six years his claim must be held as barred. The quest-
ion as to what length of delay in proceedings to enforce a
maritime lien will bar an action, is aliays one fact to be de-
termined in view of the particular circumstainces of each case-
In The Tiger 90 F. Rpt. 826. a period of seventeen months, ten
of which the boat was out of comission and then sold to a
bona fide purchaser, was considered too long, and the libellant
was barred from recovering from such a purchaser. Had a bona
fide purchaser not entered into the question, the delay would
very likely have been looked upon as insufficient to bar a
recovery. The party possessed of the lien, having a right to
(a) The Ambay. 36 F. 925.
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follow the ship even in innocent hands, it is only just that
he should enforce his rights with reasonable promptness, in
order that innocent purchasers may not be needlessly deceived
by delay on his part. The libellant may and may not have an
action in personam against the owner of the ship after the
lien has been lost, such a right not being dependent upon the lien.
So as to Statutes of limitation, they are followed by
analogy in Adirlty and Equity. If no special equitable rea-
son exists against the application of a statutory limitation,
it may be employed. As a rule there is no equitable reason
for going beyond the statutory limit.
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COSTS.
The matter of Costs in admiralty is wholly under the con-
trol of the Court giving them. They are sometimes from equi-
table considerations denied to the party who recovers his de-
mand and sometimes given to the one who fails to recover any-
thing as is the case when he has been mislead in commencing
the suit by fault of' the other party. Undoubtedly costs gener-
ally follow the decree of the court. However circuristarces of
equity, of hardship, of orpression or of negligence often in-
duce the court not to follow the general rule;..(a) As to costs
in a collision suit there are no peculiarities apart from the
rest of' admiralty law. He who fails in a suit must usually
pay the costs. If both are in fault each pays his own costs
or they are devided. No council fees can be allowed as costs
beyond those given by statute.(b) The other conditions which
may arise may be as follows. If the libel is dismissed or the
action is looked upon as being brought without cause, costs
(a) Sapphire 18 Wall. 51.
(b) The Baltimore 8 Wal1277.
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will be given against the person so bringing. If both are not
equally in fault, costs will be borne by the vessel most to
blame.If neither is to blameeach should bear his own . Costs
may also be ten in punishment, as where a vessel not in fault
for a collision fails to render proper aid as in standing by
to save life and property. In a case where proceodings are
had for a vessel or cargo lost or damaged, if there are several
libles which might legally be joined in one, there should not
be allowed upon them all more costs than upon the one, unless
there exists some good reason for so doing which is satisfactor-
ily shown. But allowence may be made on one libel for costs
incidentpl to several claims.(b)
As to security for libellants costs, the Supreme Court
Rules do not seem to have expressly required any to be given.
However, in many districts by special rules process xili not
be issued until the libellant has filed a stipulation for costs
thereby agreeing to pay all costs and expenses awarded against
him by the court. The amount required varies in diff'erent
districts. In some it is more than double the amount for a
(b) Sec. 078 Rev..Stat.
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suit in rem that it is for one in personan. Ey the district
rules in Iew York ore ceoulrity must be furnished if the libel-
lant is a resident, otherwise two. The amounts secured generally
run from one hundred to two hundred and fifty dollars. It' the
United States was the libellant, as would almost never be the
case in collisions, no security need be furnished, the National
government not being liable for costs in any court. There
being nothing peculiar about this subject as connected with
collisions, only the general principles which courts of Admir-
alty Jurisdiction follow have been pointed out.
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CONSTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES
RULES OF NAVIGATION.
Rules of Navigation have been defined as a system of
rules and regulations to be followed in the navigation of s ips
or vessels when approaching each other under such circumstances
that a collision may possibly ensue. In their very definition,
it is to be noticed that they are rules formulated and enforced
for the purpose of preventing collisions between ships. They
have practic'lly no other purpose than that of preventing loss
of life and property in thais manner. Rules of navigation nave
been in use as long as navigation has had any prominence in
aiding the world's commerce. The principles of the rules now
employed in American waters and amiong maritime nations, may
be found in the laws of Oleron , Wisby and Rhodes.
The Rules of Navigation may be divided into four classes,
three of whicii are formulated by Congress nnd the fourth by
local authority through the permission of Congress. They are,
First: The International Rules.
Second: Those applying to the Great Lakes and connecting
waters.
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Third: Those applying to certain iharbors, rivers and
inland waters.
Fourth: Local rules by local harbor and river authorities.
The first class the International Rules, apply to all
public and private vessels of the United States upon the Hi:h
Seas and in all waters connected therewith navigable by sea-
going vessels. These rules were to tde effect as a set of
international regulations, IMarch'Ist.1895, but by a request of
Great Britain, they did not formally go into effect until July
Ist. 1897. They may be found together with their amendments in
29 Statutes at Large P. 885.
The second class of rules, applies to all public and pri-
vate vessels of the United States upon the Great Lakes, their
connecting and tributary waters, "as far East as Montreal and
the Red River of the :.Korth", and rivers emptying into the Gulf
of Mexico and their tributaries. These rules took elf'ect as
they now exist, 1.arch ist., 1895.
The third class applies as a set of special rules duly
made by local authority "to all vessels navi~rating all harbors,
rivers and inland waters not included in the second class.
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These took effect Oct., 7th., 1897.
The fourtih class are in the nature of local police regula-
tions of harbors, niarbor lights and riveis, pilot laws, etc.,
which Congress nas seen fit to leave to local authorities to
reuIlate. The first three classes do not differ widely. In
fact, in a great part the second !ond third are copies of por-
tions of the first. Such differences as exist and are import-
ant will be pointed out.
International Rules.
The International Rules are not new, but consist principal-
ly of the rules long in use, somewhat c.-anged and amended to
fit the needs of a world wide international commerce. The
construction placed upon these regulations will generally apply
equally well to those of the Great Lakes, rivers and --arbors.
Many phases that might create difficulty are given a definite
construction by the Statute itself,for the meaning of some,
however, it will be necessary to go to the cases. This Stat-
ute, except the amendments may be found in 26 Statut at Large
P. 320., and witli amend.ments in 29 Statutes at Large, P. 885.
It considers lights, signals, speel, steering and sailing
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rules etc. Only portions aiding in or demanding construction
will be quoted.
The statute says, it is to be understood that where in-
land waters are mentioned that thoy are not to be taken as
including the Great Lakcs and tbeir connecting and tributary
waters, as far East as Montreal.
In following these sailing rules every steam vessel which
is under sail and not under steam is to be considered a sail-
ing vessel, and every vessel under steam is to be considered
a steam vessel, whether under steam or not. The term steam
vessel is to include any vessel propelled by machinery. This
would include a naptha launch. But the fact that a sloop has
a small naptha engine as an auxiliary power does not allow a
steamer to treat her as a steamship and thereby be relieved
from the duty of keeping out of the way. (a)
A vessel is under way when she is not at anchor or made
fast to the shore or aground. A vessel slowly driving over a
sandbar would not be looked upon as under way, but as aground.
The word "visible" waen applied to lights means visible
on a dark night in a clear atmosphere. This gives the most
(a) Donnell v. Boston Tow Boat Co., 89 F. Rep. 757.
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favorable definition tbat could well be allowed.
A slort blast o.- a horn or whistle equals a blast of about
one second. A prolonged blast, one fcron fo-Lr to six seconds.
A long blast, one much longer than either, no specified time
being g;v,-,-.
"Ef'iclent" as applied to fog horns, etc., would seem to
mean simply what it implies, "suitable for the purpose" of
giving a proper warning or fulfillinlg its intended purpose.
W.ot:er such a fog horn or other appliance had been furnished
would have to be determine, in ertch- case fro!i the existing
facts.
Article 16, reads, "Every vessel shall in fog, mist fall-
in, snow or heavy rain-storm, go at a moderate sped rnaving
careful regard to the existin- circumstances and conditions. '
"A steam vessel hearing apparently forward of her beam the
fIo;- si.-nals of a vessel, the position of which is not ascertain-
ed, shall so far as theo (irciumtamces of the case admit, stop
ner engines and then navigate with caution n:ltil davwer of
collision is over."
1,Moderate Speed.
Over the words "Moderate speed" in the fiirst part of tifiLs
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article there has been considerable discussion. Moderate speed
is not defined in the statute, so it has thereby been left
open for the courts to construe. Many constructions of a more
or less conclusive character have been given. Here it will
be profitable only to examine those which are best considered.
In the City of New York, 15 F. Rep. 624., it was said
that a moderate speed is at least, whatever it may be under
given circumstances, something materially less than that of
the full speed which is customary and allowable when there are
no obstructions in the way of safe navigation. In Clare, v.
Providence etc., 20 F. Rep.535., it was attempted to show that
full speed was more safe in a fog than any slower rate of
navigation. iuch good and expert opinion was shown to that
effect, but the Judge held that the law required a moderate
spee d which "at least means moderate speed; reduced speed, less
than usual speed", and that one wilfully violating the law by
maintaining full speed in a fog must do so at his peril. In
the case of the Nacoochee,137 U. S. 330., the construction of
the words "moderate speed" was brought to practicaliy its
present interpretation. In that case a steamer was going at
half speed in a heavy fog, when it collided with a schooner
and sunk her. It was possible to see ahead about five hundred
feet. The stcamer going at the rate of half her speed would
?orge a!-ead six or eiht hundred feet after her engines were
reversed at full speed. During the time required for reversing
the vessel would proceed about two hundred feet. it was held
that under the circumstances the stemaer was bound to observe
unusual caution and to maintain only such a rate of speed as
would enable her to come to a stand-still by reversing her
engines~at full speed before she would collide with a vessel
wvhich she should see through the fog. in considering the speed
to be maintained at such a time, the distance a ship coming
out of the fog would traverse if properly navigated should be
taken into account. The construction given in the Nacoochee
was adopted in The Umbria, 163 U.S. 404. It was there consider-
ed that the "general consensus of opinion" in this country
was that in a fog a steamer is bound to use only such precautions
as will enable her to stop in time to avoid a collision after
the approaching vessel comes in sight, provided that the approach-
ing vessel is herself going at the moderate speed required by
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law. The fact that tlhe Umbria was a passenger and mail steamer
made no difference, even though such ships were in the habit
of so navigating In order to more quickly get out of the fog.
It has been said that a vessel should slow down if need be,
to the lowest rate of' speed consistent with a proper control
of the ship. Again it has been stated that, if need be, in
order to insure safety a vessel should stop and anchor.
It has been suggested in connection with the rule set
forth in the Umbra above that in order to insure absolute safety
when vessels are otherwise navigating properly, that a moderate
speed for any vessel should only be such a speed as would per-
mit a vessel to stop within one half the distance that
it is'possible under the circumstances to see a vessel ahead
in the fog. if the time is night instead of day, the whistle,
bell or horn of the other-vessel will give warning of its pres-
ence and its lights more definitely locate its whereabouts.
For purposes of avoiding collisions a ship becomes visible
with the appearance of its lights. So the meaning riven by
the court to the words moderate speed seem to be,that at any
and all times, when required it means at least, less than full
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speed, and accordin to the late decisions of the Supreme Court
may be still further defined as meaning the speed demanded oy
such precautions as will enrable a vessel to stop in time to
avoid a collision, after an approaching vessel comes in sight,
the oncoming ship being properly navigated.
As to the second part of Article 16,not much need be said.
" A steam vessel hearing apparently forward of her beam the
fog signals of a vessel, the position of whicn is not ascertain-
ed shall so far as the circumstances of the case adnit, stop
her engines and then navilate with caution until danger of
collision is over."
What constitutes navigating with caution is more clearly
suggested t'hLan what constitutes moderate speed. The City of
New York, 147 U.S. 72., navigating with c9ution, when a fog-
horn was heard a point off her starboard bow was looked upon
as consisting merely ofr stopping her engines and then navigat-
ing with care, by means of to imxpetus rained; but if the
vessel seemed close at hand should reverse until the bark or
whatever the ship may be came in sight. If any uncertainty,
the ship should stop at once. However, this is not to be taken
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to mean that when a steamer running in the fog, liears a signal
it must stop at the first sound. SucL precaution is not nec-
essary, unless the proximity of the signol be such as to indi-
cate immediate danger. :,%or does tlhe fact that a steamer was
a short time before the collision running at full spee-1 render
it liable, if at the tire of the collision it was running "dead
slow", fully under control. In respect to the circumstances
of the collision in such a case due caution has been exercised
no otiher negligence being imputed. (a)
Application of Rules.
If any doubt arises in respect to these rules, as to the
need of applying tLem in a particular case, they should have
the benefit o7 a doubt, and be applied. A clear example of
this is found in the explicit orders given in Act 24, that
"if a vessel is in doubt as to whether she is overtaking another
or it shoul. be as:sumed that such is the case, and keep out
of the way accordingly." As to what constitutes an overtaking
vessel, the article is explicit, obviating any chance for such
uncertainty arisiIrg as in the case of "moderate speed". In
defining an overtahing vessel the Statute says that.
(a) Ludwig Halberg, 157 U.S. GO.
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Overtaking- Vessel.
"Every vessel cc-,ing up with another vessel fron any di-
rection more than two points abaft the beam, that is in such
a position with reference to tie other vessel which she is
overtaking that at i)ight she wolId be unable to see either of
the other vessels' side- i.,hts, shall be dee'med an overtaking
vessel, and no subsequent alteration of the bearing between
the two vessels shall make the overtaking vessel a crossing
vessel within the mTeaning of those rules, or release her of
the duty of keeping clear of the overtaking vessel until she
is finally past and clear."
This rule concerning overtaking vessels is expressly
stated not to be varied by any other rules of the navigation
laws. Having once become an overtai.ing vessel a ship must con-
sider herself as meaning so until all possibility of collision
is over. That possibility the Statute considers removed, only
when the overtaking vessel is "past and clear". The reason
for requiring the overtaken vessel to exorcie special care,
is that such a vessel can more easily watch the others move-
ments, ;,ile attending to her own.
How Construed.
Article 27,29 and 30, point out certain matters to be
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observed in constricting thiese riles arid obeying them. Article
27, says,"that due regard must be had to all dangers of naviga-
tion and collision, and to any special circumstances which may
render a depqrture from them necessary in order to avoid immedi-
ate danger". Such a case w urd be when by no fault of her own
a ship finds that to follow tne rules of navigation would
cause her to run aground or collide with still another vessel
than the one that forced her into her difficult position.
In all such cases a ship will nave given the rules proper atten-
tion, if she tries to do the best possible under the circumstan-
ces. If in fault, for getting in such a position, efforts made
too late to avoid a collision, will not excuse her previous
disobedience.
By Article 29, "Nothing in these rules shall exhonorate
any vessel or the owner, or master or crew thereof from the
consequences of any neglect to carry lights or signals or of
any neglect to keep a proper lookout or of the neglect of any
precaution w-,ich may be required by the ordianry practice of
seamen , or by the special circumstances of the case."
This is imrrortant in that it leaves in force customary
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rules of action well known among seamen, that may not have
been enacted in statutory form. The cases recognize the force
of such custons and permit a proper adherence to them . It
also renders more imperative that a vessel in a hard place
should do its best under the circumstances, to avoid a collision.
But for such requirements a vessel might say it was not in
fault for the danger, and could not get away without violating
the rules,so made no effort.
By Article 30, these rules are not to interfere with the
special rules for h-irbors, rivers and inland waters.
Concerning the force of the Rules of Navicfation, the
courts have reached one general decision to the effect that
these rules and regulations prescribed by law furnish paramout
rules of decision in all cases where they are applied. Out-
side of these general rules and the decisions of the court,
customs and general usage may govern. These rules bind Ameri-
can vessels on the High Seas as strictly as when in American
waters, and American ves_ els may be sued in the United States
courts for violating them even when the vessel sueing is gov-
erned by an entirely different system of maritime laws. A
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vessel of any other nation on the High Seas is 1ound by its
own laws and is liable only for such violation.(a) However
among maritime nations there is now but small chance for such
a case to arise.
As to what are proper lights, sound and fog signals, sig-
nals of distress, the rights of sailing ves,-3els over vessels
propelled by steam modes of navigation in a fog, heavy rain or
falling snow, or at any other time, the rules set forth,too
clearly to need any further discussion here. It is enough to
repeat the general principle which has been pointed out and
illustrated in another connection that a violation of these
rules being shown, negligence is presumed and the burden of
proof is on the one so violating to show thnt the act complain-
ed of in no way contributed to the disaster.(b) The only ex-
ception being when oy no possibility the violation could have
contribuited to the collision
Rules for Great Lakes.
The rules and regulations for the Great Lakes differ from
the International rules more widely than those for Larbors,
(a), The Belgenlai-,),l14, .. 355.
(b) The Zouave, 90 Fed. Rep. 440.
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rivers and iiIland waters. _Special attention is given to tow-
age, rafts, canal boats, small craft and the lights and signals
in respect to the same. Regulations are also prescribed difi'er-
in- from the International rules, in regard to navigating in
narrow channels, rivers and currents where extra care is re-
quired by vessels meeting and passing. In general the regula-
tions are such as the peculiar physical conditions existing on
the Great Lakes and the rivers flowing into the Gulf of Mexico
and the lake and river craft there employed, would demand.
With such rivers as the Detroit and St. Clair, the Mississippi
and other streams flowing into the Gulf to navigate, and differ-
ent kinds of vessels navigating theere, such as are above men-
tioned, a somewhat different set of rules is necessary. No
special peculiarity of construction however, is found in these
rules whic= the rules themselves, or the constructions given
to the doubtful points in the International regulations would
not .iale clear. They are found in 28 Statutes at Large, P.645.
Harbor and River Rules.
The rules and regulations applying to harbors,rivers and
inland waters wore separated into two divisionrs coprising
classes "three" and"four". Class three as indicated, consists
I4f.
of cith rules as have been passed by Congress applying to the
above navigable waters. Class four consists of local regula-
tions applying to the same. In the rules passed by Congress,
"Inl'Ind waters" are not to be understood as including the Great
Lakes and their connecting anLd tributary waters as far East as
Montreal. It is to be noticed, that this definition does not
comprise the navigable rivers flowing into the Gulf of Mexico
which are included, so far as applicable, in the rules and re-
gulations to prevent collisions on the Great Lakes. These
special waters being excepted and az others from the general
meaning of the v,,rds "inland waters", the regulations must be
considered as applicable to all the rest therein included,
namely to the Mississippi River and other rivers flowing into
the Gulf of Mexico. These regulations are very mucr. the same
as the International Rules as far as they Co. In fact when
Congress first enacted a general system of regulations to avoid
collisions in hqrbors, rivers and inland waters, special por-
tions of the previous maritime renulatiors were selected and
designated as h.aving full force upon tiuose waters. The present
rules are to be found in 26 Statutes at Large, P. 90., certain
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portions of the International Rules that apply only to ocean
navigation are omitted, and such changes and additions have
been made as tl.e more crowded condition of harbors, riveros and
inland waters with their different kinds of craft demand.
Greater frequency of signals is required, special regulations
are riven as to li :hts, pilot boats, tugs, row-boats and other
craft common to rivers and harbors, but not known on the High
Seas. Lights are provided distinguishing seagoing ships from
those of the harbor or river.
By the wording of the Statuteq these rules"apply as special
rules duly made by local authority, to all vessels navigating
all harbors, rivers, etc." WVether they are to be regarded as
applying to vessels of foreign nations does not seem clear.
They are to apply "as special rules made by local authority"
and "to all vessels". The trouble rests in the fact that the
rules enacted by local harbor and river authorities are not
looked upon as binding upon foreign vessels fully observing the
International Rules. These rules, though largely a copy from
those regulations are distinctly stated to apply as special
rules duly made by local authority. Vnether ti:e fact that they
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are primarily enacted oy Coi,,r ,sz would moke any differe,cce
does not appear. If7 it does not, and they are to be classed
as harbor re, ;iiations by local authorities, they apply only to
United States vessels public and y, rivate. It would seon from
the care taken to expressly state thlat ti.ey are to be looked
upon as regulations by local authority, that they were intended
to have only the force of such re.ilations.
Local Regulati on-.
V7hat has been said concerning the construction placed
upon special words and p:,rases in the International Rules,
applies here where the same are used. These regulations iay be
found in 30 Statutes at Large, P. 06.
The second division of harbor and river rules, or "Clas
four" as the rules pertaining to navirzation were divided, con-
sist only of such regulations as Congress has see., fit to leave
in control of local authorities. They are local and h-arbor
regulations and pilot rules to be observed in the special harbor
or rivers to whici they relate. if violated by Public or pri-
vate vessels of the United States, such violation will be deem-
ed negligence. They have force as mere police regulations;
and as has been said, do not afi ect the vessels of roreim7
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nations. (a) .
Briefly summed up, the rules and regulations for navi-ation
are the best criterion for deciding whetiher a vessel i~as acted
properly, and in so deciding, they are to be construed with
reasonable strictness. They are to be looked upon as arplicable
in all cases until the contrary is shown. They ihave been form-
ulated to prevent the loss of life and property by means of
collisions, so if at any time, the excencies of a situation
plainly demanded a departure from them in order to insure safe-
ty, they are not ten to be construed as requiring a strict ad-
nerence. Such a departure must, however, in order to receive
the benefit of such a construction have been made through thle
demands of necessity or in the excitement of immediate collision
for which the ship departing is not in fault. If a vessel
doggedly adheres to th-ese rules in the face of inevitable col-
Iision, the prescribed course being pursued, its act will be
construed as a violation ol" the -eneral intent of the statutes
in not using due care under tne circumstancos.
Section 4412, of the Revisel Statutes of the United States,
provides for a board of Supervising Inspectors, who "shall
(a) The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186.
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establish sucl, regulations as may be necessary, to be observed
by steam vessels in passing each other as they from time to
time slmll think necessary for safety."' This board consists
of' one Supervisi- isu,-rector General and ten supervisory in-
spectors. The rules thus passcd are to add to the rules of
Congress. Two copies are to be furnished to vessels and con-
spicuously posted.
Further quotations fCrc:. tie various statutes regulating
navigation in American waters does not seem necessary. Their
wording is clear and any furtner comment upon them would amount
to but little more than a repetition of the words of the different
enactments.
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CONCU RENT JURISDICTION OF
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS.
Subdivision t,.ree of Sec. 711, Rev. Stat., gives to the
United States courts Admiralty Jurisdiction as follows: "exclu-
sive jurisdiction of all civil cases of Admiralty and llaritie
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a
Common law remedy wi'ere tfio Co:-I on law is competent to give it."
This clause would indicate that i1 some cases the Fodorai
jurisdiction would be exclusive and in other concurrent with
jurisdiction possessed by tne cojirts of the state. The question
of there being sucL. concurront jurisdiction in adniralty ro!-
lisions has been decided by a number of cases following short-
ly after the Genessee Chief, which assured to the Federal
courts jurisdiction over the Great Lakes. In iine,v. Trevor 4
Wall- 555, a collision occurred between tne steamships Hine and
Sunshine on tLe Nfississippi River near St. Louis. The Sunshine
was injured, later the Hine was seized in order to be sold
in accordance with a proceeding under tne laws of Iowa,
in satisfaction of damages-sustained by the Sunshine. By the
iowa code, a lien wus given against any boat found in the
waters of the state, for injury sustaired bv persons or property.
The proceeding was one strictly in rem and the owners of the
Hive interposed a plea to the Jurisdiction of the State Courts.
It was held, that all state Statutes which attempted to confer
upon State Courts a remedy for marine tacts and cont.racts by
proceeding strictly in rem were void being in conflict with
the act of Congress of 1789, except as to cases arising on the
Lakes and connecting waters. Nor could sucl. state statutes be
looked upon as within the saving clause of the act in respect
to Common law remedies. This rule however, does riot prvent
the seizure and sale by the State Co1arts of the interest of an
owner or part owner in a vessel, either by attachment or by
general execution, when the proceeding is a personal action
against such an owner to recover a debt for which he is person-
ally liable, nor does it prevent any action from being brought
in the State Courts, which the Common law gives for obtaining
a judgment in personam against a party liable in a marine con-
tract or marine tact. The Moses Taylor 4 Wall. 441., is to
thle same general effect as the previous case entirely denying
jurisdiction in the state courts whten it is there attempted to
grant a remedy for a marine contract or :,rinc tact by proceed-
ings strictly in rem. All such claims when a remedy in rem is
given, are looked upon as exclusively in the Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts.
In proceedings in personar concurrent jurisdiction may
exist. The clause "saving the rights of common law remedy
where the Common Law is competent to give it", does not accord-
ing to Hinev. Trevorauthorize a proceeding in rem to enforce
a maritime lien in a Common law court, whether that court is
State or Federal. The Common Law remedies are not at all appli-
cable to enforce such liens . They are as has been indicated,
suits in personam, even though under special statute they may
be commenced by attachment against the debtor- So in all cases
when a maritime lien arises, whether from a tact or a contract
the original jurisdiction to enforce it by a proceeding in
rem must be exclusively in the District Courts of the United
States. (a)
(a) The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624.
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The granting of a right of action in personam for loss of
life, is not in conflict with tL-e Admiralty jurisdiction of
the district courts of' the United States even though no such
remedy existed apart from the state statute. Where the state
has given a remedy in personam not existing in adniralty, the
Federal Courts will enforce it so long as not contrary to the
rules and laws of Admiralty. The steamboat Co., v. Chase 10
Wall. 522.
Appeal.
Where an action has been brought in a state court in per-
sonam, and it is appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States, the party plaintiff having elected to pursue his
Common law remedies in a State Court, the rules of the Common
law will be applied on appeal and not the rules of Admiralty.
This makes th-e jurisdiction of the Federpl and state courts
concurrent not only over the question iu litigation, but also
in the law applied. An example of this is wriere a plaintiff
has brought his action in personam for the loss of his ship.
BotL ships were negligent and contributed to the collision.
At Common law such being the case, no recovery can be had. The
case being al..pealed to the Supreme Court, the Admiralty rule
1
~ ~ *
will not be applied, but the rule at law. The jurisdiction is
concurrent both as to the matter of the action, and as to
remedies an lied. The plfintif. has elected such a system of
law to give him his remedy and the Federal Courts will not a-tr-
,iards when he has discovered that his choice was a poor one,
give him tiho benefit of a system of law more favorable to his
cause. Having made an election, he must stid by it.(a)
The cases sunmed up, seem to amount to tnis; W.en the
action arisingi because of a collision is to enforce a marine
contract or to gain satisfaction for a -narine tact, tve state
courts have a concurrent jurisdiction, if the v-roceeding is
strictly in rem, but if in pcrsonaon such concurrent jurisdiction
exists. In all cases where a common law right of action remains
and also it seems where a right of action has been given in
personam by State Statutes, as in the Stcamboat Co.. v. Chase,
and not contrary to Federal laws, ti-e state Las concurrent
jurisdiction with the Federal Courts. In short concurrent
jurisdiction extends only to actions in perso91.
At Comraqon law there 1-as always been a right of action for
(a) Belden v. Chase,u53 U.S. 374.
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damages arising from a collision at sea, so the provision that
such rights are reserved-, clearly -lves concurrent jurisdiction
to th.e Co;-non law courts of the states.
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